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The Exclusionary Rule and Damages: An Economic 
Comparison of Private Remedies for Unconstitutional 
Police Conduct 
Jeffrey Standen∗  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Apart from its constitutional status,1 the exclusionary rule is 
nothing more than an instance of the common law remedy of resti-
tution.2 Like restitutionary remedies in general, it is founded on the 
principle of unjust enrichment.3 The exclusionary rule requires that 
 
∗  Professor of Law, Willamette University. For their helpful comments, I would like to 
thank Kevin Cole, Frank Partnoy, Judd Sneirson, Vincent Chiapetta, Richard Birke, and the 
faculty at the University of San Diego, where a draft of this paper was presented. 
 1. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the court held that evidence seized 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in federal prosecutions. Weeks, however, 
was surprisingly ambiguous on the question of whether or not exclusion is mandated by the 
Constitution. The Court went this far: “To sanction [the use of unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence] . . . would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance 
of the prohibitions of the Constitution intended for the protection of the people against such 
unauthorized action.” Id. at 394. Weeks was limited to cases where the illegal search was con-
ducted by federal officers and the evidence was sought to be admitted in a federal criminal pro-
ceeding; the opinion explicitly rejected the proposition that the exclusionary rule should apply 
to violations by state or local police. When the Court subsequently extended the Fourth 
Amendment to the states by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Court refused to extend the remedy of exclusion, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), 
overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), thus implying that the remedy was not co-
terminous with the “right” of the Fourth Amendment. The Court again failed to resolve the 
issue of the constitutionality of the exclusionary rule in the Mapp opinion. Mapp on the one 
hand suggested that exclusion had a constitutional basis by declaring that exclusion is an “es-
sential ingredient of the Fourth Amendment,” 367 U.S. at 651, and that “all evidence ob-
tained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, in-
admissible in a state court.” Id. at 655. The opinion nevertheless allowed states to rely on 
“other methods which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effective” in “deterring un-
reasonable searches.” Id. 
 2. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Ap-
plication of Restitutive Principles of Justice, 32 EMORY L.J. 937 (1983); Saul Levmore & Wil-
liam J. Stuntz, Remedies and Incentives in Private and Public Law: A Comparative Essay, 1990 
WIS. L. REV. 483; Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement 
Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247 
(1988). 
 3. See Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191 (1995). But see 
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the prosecution of a criminal defendant who is a victim of unconsti-
tutional police conduct4 must proceed without the benefit of its ill-
gotten gain; for example, incriminating evidence discovered by virtue 
of an illegal police search must be suppressed.5 
The use of exclusion as a remedy for unconstitutional police 
conduct is problematic. Restitutionary remedies are not generally fa-
vored in civil law.6 Although their use may be growing,7 their impor-
tance remains small in comparison to the dominant position of civil 
damages, a remedy that measures compensation by the victim’s 
losses caused by the wrongdoer, not by the defendant’s gain.8 The 
relative dominance of civil damages raises the question why, when 
the Supreme Court chose from the menu of private civil remedies to 
address the problem of unconstitutional police conduct,9 it selected 
the more uncommon remedy of restitution instead of damages.10 
The Court’s answer is found in its declaration that, among civil 
remedies, only exclusion adequately protects the underlying constitu-
tional right.11 This declaration assumes that damages are not as effec-
 
Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1279 
(1989). 
 4. The exclusionary rule applies to police conduct that violates the Fourth Amend-
ment’s prohibition on unjustified searches and seizures, Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643; the Fifth 
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); 
the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel, Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); and 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clause, Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 
315 (1959). 
 5. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 383; Silverthorne Lumber, Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 
385 (1920). 
 6. See Laycock, supra note 3. 
 7. See Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65 (1985). 
 8. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.1 (2d ed. 1993). 
 9. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 383. 
 10. Compared to restitution, damages is a ubiquitous remedy. Restitution remains an 
underdeveloped area of the law. See generally JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
(1951); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES (2d ed. 1994). 
 11. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Along with the constitutional footing on 
which it justified the exclusionary remedy, see supra note 1, the Court in Mapp grounded the 
exclusionary rule in its practical effectiveness as a deterrent. “Only last year the Court itself rec-
ognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule ‘is to deter—to compel respect for the con-
stitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disre-
gard it.’” Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 
(1916)). In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court appears to have moved away from the 
constitutional footing cited in Mapp, more squarely embracing the deterrent rationale. The 
Court stated in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974), that the “use of illegally 
obtained evidence . . . presents a question, not of rights, but of remedies.” It termed the exclu-
sionary rule “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights gen-
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tive as exclusion at discouraging constitutional wrongs and that ex-
clusion is in fact adequate to the task. It is surprising that the Court’s 
assumption, that the exclusionary remedy does deter abuses of con-
stitutional rights, has gone mostly unremarked in the voluminous 
commentary on the exclusionary rule. Subsequent judicial decisions 
and academic scholarship have ignored or accepted this dubious con-
tention.12 Although many commentators have debated the jurispru-
dence of exclusion, they focus on the problem of the connection be-
tween the right and the remedy13 or the practical and theoretical 
shortcomings of using damages to address police misconduct.14 For 
the most part, the virtues and shortcomings of exclusion have not 
been extensively considered.15 Thus the very assertion that the Court 
made, that exclusion promises to provide more deterrence than does 
a damages remedy, has escaped scrutiny.16 
 
erally through its deterrence effect, rather than a personal constitutional right.” Id. at 348. 
This retreat from Mapp raises questions about the legitimacy of the rule’s enforcement against 
the states. See Joseph Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article 
III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 100 (1985); Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclu-
sionary Rule Rest on a “Principled Basis” Rather than an “Empirical Proposition”?, 16 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 565 (1983); see also Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 Yale L.J. 906, 
936 (1986) (arguing that if no effective sanction attached to the Fourth Amendment, then the 
amendment would not qualify as law, thus betraying “the fundamental principle of constitu-
tionalism, which is after all that the Constitution states the law”). 
 12. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 2, at 945 (“Some of these problems [in comparing ex-
clusion and damages] are avoided in this article by assuming what in any event is most likely 
quite true: that the exclusionary rule does deter police misconduct.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
757 (1994); Joseph D. Grano, Introduction—The Changed and Changing World of Constitu-
tional Criminal Procedure: The Contribution of the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Policy, 
22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 395 (1989); Yale Kamisar, Remembering the “Old World” of Crimi-
nal Procedure: A Reply to Professor Grano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 537 (1990); Tracey 
Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1 (1994); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
820 (1994). Judges have debated the rule along the same lines. See United States v. Jefferson, 
906 F.2d 346, 351–52 (8th Cir. 1990) (Bowman, J., and Lay, C.J., concurring). 
 14. See Meltzer, supra note 2; William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, The Good Faith 
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 
365 (1981). 
 15. The one aspect of exclusion that has been examined is the total amount of deter-
rence, as an empirical matter, that exclusion creates in an attempt to discourage unconstitu-
tional police actions. See Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 
37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970). 
 16. To avoid raising issues tangential to this paper, discussion of the exclusionary rule 
will be limited to its application to violations of the Fourth Amendment. Exclusion is also the 
remedy for violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, but arguably exclusion there rests on 
different grounds. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. 
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Examined along several dimensions borrowed from the more ro-
bust scholarship on civil remedies, exclusion does not appear to con-
stitute a clearly superior device to deter constitutional harms in com-
parison to damages. Part II of this paper will consider exclusion in 
terms of its allocative efficiency.17 From this perspective, exclusion is 
intended to provide a solution to the problem of externalities, here 
the positive externality of deterring wrongful conduct.18 This part 
will suggest that exclusion, like restitutionary remedies more gener-
ally, does not promise to generate as much deterrence as would a 
damages remedy arrayed against miscreant officers. This part will 
conclude by suggesting that damages are so productive of positive 
externalities that they could substantially replace other public sanc-
tions in shaping officer conduct. Part III will reconsider exclusion, 
not as a response to the positive externality problem, but rather as an 
attempt to overcome the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” that can be em-
ployed to model the police-citizen interaction.19 This part will sug-
gest that a damages remedy, not exclusion, appears more likely to 
induce the cooperative behavior that will ensure maximum joint re-
turns. Part IV compares the tendencies of exclusion and damages to 
minimize principal/agency problems, thus minimizing unconstitu-
tional police conduct.20 Finally, Parts V21 and VI22 consider practical 
advantages frequently cited in favor of exclusion. The analysis here, 
as throughout the paper, suggests that damages are at least as good 
 
REV. 865, 878 (1981) (stating that a constitutional violation of Fifth Amendment occurs when 
coerced confession is admitted at trial). 
 17. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2, at 13 (5th ed., As-
pen Law & Business 1998) (stating that “efficiency . . . denote[s] that allocation of resources 
in which value is maximized”). Value is maximized when no further change in some relevant 
economic variable would yield more benefits than costs. The criterion for the achievement of 
this state of efficiency is less obvious: under the “Pareto Efficiency” criterion, efficiency is 
reached when the welfare of any one person cannot be enhanced without making another per-
son worse off. Id. at 13–14. It implies only consensual transactions with unanimous consent 
“of all affected persons.” Id. at 14. Under the “Kaldor-Hicks” efficiency criterion, as long as 
the person who benefits from a change in an economic variable could in theory compensate 
the person who loses from such a change, irrespective of whether or not in fact such compensa-
tion occurs, then the change in variable is efficient. Id. This approach to efficiency is consistent 
with utilitarian perspectives and permits nonconsensual transactions. See generally HENRY N. 
BUTLER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 77–78 (1998). 
 18. See infra notes 23–32 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 100–11 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 124–43 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 144–73 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra notes 174–93 and accompanying text. 
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as exclusion in meeting the stated social objectives, and in fact are 
probably better, offering a more refined solution to the perpetual 
problem of constraining police behavior. 
II. EXCLUSION, ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY, AND EXTERNALITIES 
In Elkins v. United States,23 the Court contended that exclusion 
presents the only effective remedy to deter wrongful police conduct: 
“The [exclusionary] rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its 
purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guar-
anty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive 
to disregard it.”24 Deterrence can usefully be thought of as an exter-
nality.25 The sanction of exclusion assessed in one case aims to influ-
ence conduct in others. The claim that exclusion presents the best 
means of compelling adherence to the Constitution is at bottom a 
claim that exclusion will better generate identifiable externalities and 
that those externalities will be positive.26 Unlike negative external-
ities,27 the problem posed by positive externalities is that “the mar-
ket,”28 left unregulated, will likely under-produce the desired good 
 
 23. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). 
 24. Id. at 217. The Court added in Mapp v. Ohio that were exclusion not the sanction 
for unconstitutional police conduct then “the assurance against unreasonable federal searches 
and seizures would be ‘a form of words,’ valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual 
charter of inestimable human liberties. . . . To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality 
to withhold its privilege and enjoyment.” 367 U.S. 643, 655–56 (1961). 
 25. An externality is the effect of an action that influences the well-being of nonconsent-
ing parties. See BUTLER, supra note 17. The “consenting” parties to a criminal action refers to 
the government as prosecutor and the criminal defendant. Deterrence refers to the effect of the 
disposition of the case between the prosecutor and the defendant on other parties; specifically, 
that the outcome creates incentives for others, here police officers, to avoid the outcome by 
not engaging in the specified behavior. See POSNER, supra note 17, at 237–50; JAMES Q. 
WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 162–82, 198–209 (1975); Ernest van den Haag, Punish-
ment as a Device for Controlling the Crime Rate, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 706, 706–20 (1981). 
 26. A “positive” externality is one where the social benefits of engaging in an activity are 
greater than the private benefits. See BUTLER, supra note 17, at 380. A classic example of a 
good that produces positive externalities is the inoculation, which not only lessens the inci-
dence of disease in the recipient but also inhibits contagion, producing a benefit for others. 
 27. Economic analysis holds that crime itself is an externality. See Kenneth G. Dau-
Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 1. More clearly, constitutional violations by police officers are also an externality, as 
violations usually arise as a by-product of otherwise lawful and socially desirable police intru-
sions. 
 28. “The market” is defined generally as the gamut of private, consensual transactions, 
including those based on a contract and those without, that together amount to an identifiable 
if ephemeral phenomenon. See generally POSNER, supra note 17, at 3–24. 
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because a portion of the utility from the good is distributed to a dif-
fused group and not captured by one person;29 and thus, no one per-
son will pay enough for the good for it to be sold at the margin.30 A 
positive externality is thus tantamount to a public good.31 
The problem with public goods is ensuring their supply. The de-
terrence of wrongful police conduct would likely be underproduced 
if one of two conditions obtained: if a significant amount of wrong-
ful behavior went undetected or if that substantial underdetection 
were not remedied by penalties that substantially exceeded the offi-
cer’s gain.32 In other words, if there are detection problems,33 it is 
imperative that the remedy for wrongful police conduct be suffi-
ciently sizable to ensure the optimal production of the positive ex-
ternality of deterrence. 
Civil remedies are numerous and diverse, and they differ in their 
ability to produce positive externalities depending on the context in 
which they are applied. In outline, civil remedies are divisible into 
two categories: those based on gain and those based on loss.34 
Remedies based on gain include restitution35 and forfeiture;36 loss-
 
 29. This claim is not without its objectors. Under the Coase Theorem, R. H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), there is impliedly no such thing as an exter-
nality, merely transactions costs and ill-defined property rights that stand in the way of mutu-
ally consensual trades. For instance, the problem of pollution is not a problem of externality 
and consequent internalization but rather a problem of minimizing transactions costs among 
all persons affected by the pollution and then assigning a clear property right in the pollution. 
At that point, the parties can trade assets and rights to arrive at a mutually beneficial resolution 
to the problem, or at least as beneficial as the wealth positions of the parties will permit. 
 30. One example of a positive externality is vaccinations, which not only benefit the re-
cipient in warding off disease, but benefit the community by diminishing contagion. As a re-
sult, it is allocatively efficient for the government to subsidize vaccinations in order to promote 
their employment to the point where social gains are maximized. 
 31. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
 32. On optimal penalties in criminal law, see Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: 
An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). The textual statement should be quali-
fied by recognition that the gain and loss from unconstitutional police conduct accrues not 
directly to the particular police officer but to the department or larger governing entity. See 
infra notes 135–37 and accompanying text. 
 33. See infra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. On detection problems and the law 
as it applies to punitive remedies, see Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of 
Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982). 
 34. See Jeffrey Standen, The Fallacy of Full Compensation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 145, 150 
(1995). 
 35. Professor Kull, who is the Reporter for the Third Restatement of Restitution, has 
described restitution as based on the concept of unjust enrichment. See Kull, supra note 3; see 
also DOBBS, supra note 8, § 4.1(1). 
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based remedies ordinarily include damages,37 fines,38 and injunc-
tions.39 The thesis in this section also has two parts: first, except for 
unusual situations, gain-based remedies in general, and exclusion in 
particular, hold little promise for the generation of positive external-
ities and should be avoided when crafting a remedy to meet a social 
aim; second, on the other hand, loss-based remedies hold so much 
promise to generate positive externalities that they could largely sup-
plant existing public remedies.40 
If this thesis is correct, then, unfortunately, much of the Court’s 
jurisprudence on the exclusionary rule is wrong.41 Remedies meas-
ured by gain, in contrast to remedies based on loss, will tend not to 
produce sufficient positive externalities. Gain and deterrence, unlike 
loss and deterrence, are a poor match: deterrence is based on loss, 
aiming to prevent conduct that results in loss.42 A remedy such as ex-
 
 36. Forfeiture varies in scope, but a common feature is that the wrongdoer must forfeit 
the fruit or gain amassed from the crime. See generally DAVID B. SMITH, PROSECUTION AND 
DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES (1993). Civil forfeitures proceed in rem, by which the basis 
of the suit is not the wrongdoing of the owner but, strangely, the property itself. See Arthur W. 
Leach & John G. Malcolm, Criminal Forfeiture: An Appropriate Solution to the Civil Forfeiture 
Debate, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 246 (1994); Steven L. Schwarcz & Alan E. Rothman, 
Civil Forfeiture: A Higher Form of Commercial Law?, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 287, 292–93 
(1993). 
 37. See United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958) (stating that 
damages are measured by the market value of the loss). 
 38. Fines under the federal sentencing guidelines are based on the severity of the crime. 
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.2 (1994). The severity of the crime in 
turn is in part based on the loss incurred from the crime. See id.; see also Stephen Breyer, The 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1 (1988). 
 39. See Jeffrey Standen, Private Remedies for Public Purposes, WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2000). 
 40. Public remedies include administrative or regulatory approaches to minimizing po-
lice misconduct. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. 
REV. 1521, 1562–72 (1981). 
 41. Lawmakers seem to be very interested in adding on what amount to private reme-
dies to public legal regimes and often appear to prefer to add gain-based remedies when they 
do so. Forfeiture to the state, a remedy created by legislatures, has recently become popular in 
the criminal system and is measured by the putative defendant’s gain. Restitution to the victim 
is another private remedy that has gained a foothold in the criminal system. Although restitu-
tion is characteristically measured by defendant’s gain, most state statutes use the term “restitu-
tion” somewhat awkwardly to indicate a payment of damages, measured by loss, from the per-
petrator to the victim. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 147.125 (1999) (including the victim’s 
losses and harm caused by crime in the measure of the victim’s restitution). Thus, “victim resti-
tution” is not restitutionary in character and so will be excluded from consideration in this dis-
cussion. 
 42. Bentham’s classic definition of deterrence compared the utility of benefits to the 
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clusion that is measured by wrongful gain without regard to the de-
gree of loss caused by wayward police officers will likely prove some-
what inapt to its task. Moreover, the use of exclusion as the primary 
remedy for unconstitutional police conduct, rather than as an occa-
sional substitute, as restitution is used more commonly in the law of 
civil remedies, compounds the seriousness of its usual limitations and 
creates new ones. 
A. Measured by Deterrence 
The Court’s implicit belief that exclusion is superior to damages 
at deterring undesirable police conduct may be faulty. Assume that 
both exclusion and damages are employed in all cases, without trans-
actions costs, detection problems,43 or other impediments to en-
forcement and without regard to the complex agency problems that 
might result from the potential imposition of a personal damages 
judgment on a police officer.44 In other words, in every case where 
unconstitutional police conduct has occurred, assume that the evi-
dence seized as a result of that conduct is excluded by the exclusion-
ary rule or, if in a damages system, that damages, measured either by 
the loss to the suspect or by the government’s savings in not comply-
ing with constitutional rules,45 are extracted. 
For a remedy based on gain to deter more than one based on 
loss, then either the aggregate of gain or its average must exceed that 
of loss. The total penalty imposed on the wrongdoer46 by a remedy 
measured by the wrongdoer’s gain is the inability to enjoy that 
 
disutility of losses. As long as losses exceed benefits, or pain exceeds pleasure, then the actor is 
deterred from undertaking the activity. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (London, W. Pickering 1823) (1789). 
 43. Detection problems will be reintroduced below. See infra text accompanying notes 
64–68. 
 44. These agency problems will be discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 
124–43. 
 45. In most cases, these two measures should equal each other. For instance, because 
the harm to the defendant from an illegal search is not necessarily the search itself, which may 
have taken place in any event, but rather that the search was conducted without the notice, 
safety, and justification ensured by proper authorization. The suspect’s constitutional right is 
not to be free from searches but rather to be free from unauthorized searches; the suspect’s 
entitlement is to have the police go to the trouble of obtaining a proper warrant. 
 46. The “wrongdoer” under Fourth Amendment law is either the officer who has vio-
lated the Constitution or some larger entity, such as the police department, government, or 
entire community, all of whom might benefit from the reduction in crime that arguably might 
result from an officer’s violation of a suspect’s rights. 
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gain.47 Ex ante, the expected penalty would equal the total value of 
lost gains divided by the number of constitutional violations. For ex-
clusion to impose a greater expected penalty than damages, the total 
penalty inflicted on wrongdoers by exclusion must exceed the total 
penalty that would be imposed by damages measured by loss. In 
short, gain must be greater than loss. Gain could exceed loss if one 
of the following three conditions obtains: (1) numerical frequency, if 
more cases produce gain than involve loss; (2) absolute superiority, 
where the total quantum of gain in the run of cases exceeds the 
amount of loss (without regard to numerical superiority); or (3) gain 
elicits superior detection rates (again overcoming numerical inferior-
ity). 
None of these conditions likely obtains. It is likely that police of-
ficers who violate the Constitution create more loss than they gain. 
Respecting the first condition of numerical superiority, it appears 
more plausible to conclude that police officers more often cause net 
harm from violating the Constitution than they enjoy net gain in the 
form of evidentiary advantages. Because a great deal of police activity 
is likely unmotivated by the desire for evidence and conviction,48 po-
lice may choose to violate the Constitution without intending to use 
discovered evidence at trial.49 For example, police may subdue a dis-
turbance, disperse gamblers, or dispossess the cache of a drug user all 
without a mind to developing evidence for a criminal trial.50 If police 
in such instances violate the Constitution, they cause unalloyed 
 
 47. The total penalty might also include various collateral sanctions from unconstitu-
tional conduct, such as a diminution in police department funding, officer job termination, or 
new laws restricting police investigations; it is assumed, however, that such collateral sanctions 
would not differ according to whether exclusion or damages were the prevalent remedy for 
unconstitutional police conduct. See generally John R. Lott, Jr., An Attempt at Measuring the 
Total Monetary Penalty from Drug Convictions: The Importance of an Individual’s Reputation, 
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1992). 
 48. See William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 
MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1060–77 (1995) [hereinafter Stunz, Privacy’s Problem]; see also William 
J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 
1267–72 (1999) (outlining range of permissible searches and required justifications) [hereinaf-
ter Stunz, Fourth Amendment Privacy]. 
 49. See United States v. Occhipinti, 998 F.2d 791, 800 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that 
where no evidence is obtained the propriety of police action need not be resolved). If the only 
item seized is a person, then the exclusionary rule does not operate to divest the court of its 
jurisdiction to try the person, nor need the person be released. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 
519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). 
 50. See Stuntz, Fourth Amendment Privacy, supra note 48; Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem, 
supra note 48. 
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harm, gaining no evidentiary advantage.51 On the other hand, cases 
where police have gained a large evidentiary advantage from a viola-
tion of the Constitution but inflicted only a trivial harm appear to be 
rare. Aprocryphal “exclusionary rule horror stories,” where the obvi-
ously guilty go free on the basis of trivial police misbehavior, are dif-
ficult to find.52 Perhaps the true number of “big gain” cases cannot 
be known because presumably many of them would lead prosecu-
tors, faced with the possible loss of key evidence, to offer large con-
cessions in plea bargains to avoid losing at trial.53 Even considering 
the possible existence of big gain cases that disappear in plea bar-
gains, in all likelihood gain cases remain less common than loss cases. 
Respecting the second condition, absolute superiority, gain 
could outweigh loss in fewer cases but to such an extent that in the 
aggregate it would exceed loss. Assuming risk-neutrality on the part 
of the officer,54 the expected penalty is a product of the enforcement 
 
 51. Only evidentiary advantages “count” because that gain is the sole gain to which the 
exclusionary rule responds. Other enforcement gains, such as increased obedience to law or to 
police that might come from unconstitutional police action, are not “disgorged” by exclusion 
because no trial occurs and officers do not seek one. 
 52. One horror story, although not arising under the Fourth Amendment, is Brewer v. 
Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), where a conversation in the course of a lawful transport of a 
murder suspect between police stations induced the suspect to identify the location of the 
murder victim’s body, thus implicating himself in a heinous crime. The conversation was later 
adjudged to constitute an impermissible interrogation, despite the absence of coercion, and the 
evidence was excluded. The evidence was subsequently admitted under the “inevitable discov-
ery” exception to the exclusionary rule. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
 53. The available data suggest that these cases do not arise with great frequency. See, 
e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the 
“Costs” of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests, 1983 AM. 
B. FOUND. RES. J. 611, 621 (reviewing data indicating that the rule results in nonprosecution 
or nonconviction of between 0.6% and 2.35% of suspects arrested for felonies in the state of 
California); Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assess-
ment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585, 596 (reporting that motions to suppress were filed in 
5% of cases but were successful only 0.7% of time). 
 54. If the risk preferences of offenders varies from risk neutrality, then a different trade-
off between the magnitude of the penalty and the frequency of its imposition would be in or-
der. See Becker, supra note 32. Most economists conclude that variations in the frequency of 
the imposition of punishments would have greater effect on deterrence than would increasing 
the magnitude of punishment. See Michael K. Block & Robert C. Lind, Crime and Punishment 
Reconsidered, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 241, 246–47 (1975); Michael K. Block & Robert C. Lind, 
An Economic Analysis of Crimes Punishable by Imprisonment, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 479, 489–90 
(1975). Offender preferences between magnitude and frequency should also vary by opportu-
nity costs or wealth. See John R. Lott, Jr., Should the Wealthy Be Able to “Buy Justice”?, 95 J. 
POL. ECON. 1307 (1987). 
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rate times the magnitude of the penalty.55 With unity of enforce-
ment, the total penalty from exclusion would be greater than that 
from damages if the penalty to the prosecution from exclusion were 
sufficiently large to overcome the relative paucity of occurrence. It 
appears improbable, however, that gain is absolutely superior to 
harm. The literature on the exclusionary rule suggests that it is rare 
that a piece of excluded evidence is of singular value in a particular 
criminal trial.56 Unconstitutional police searches, on the other hand, 
may carry significant costs. Unlawful police intrusions can cause 
physical damage and psychic loss, including the loss of constitutional 
rights.57 Even were gain found to be absolutely superior to loss, 
damages could still be set to exceed the value of the evidentiary 
gain,58 thus ensuring adequate deterrence. On balance it seems 
unlikely that so much evidentiary gain is obtained from compara-
tively few cases to overwhelm the more prevalent harm attending un-
constitutional police activity. 
The third condition relaxes the assumption of perfect enforce-
ment and thus presents a more complex picture. Even assuming that 
gain is neither numerically nor absolutely superior to loss in cases in-
volving unconstitutional police conduct, the third condition, if satis-
fied, would supply a cogent basis for the claim that exclusion deters 
to a greater extent than would damages. In a world of imperfect en-
forcement, this condition posits that the remedy of exclusion engen-
ders greater enforcement activity than would a competing damages 
remedy. If gain does elicit better enforcement, then the expected 
penalty from exclusion might exceed that from damages, and, conse-
quently, the exclusionary rule would produce comparatively greater 
positive externalities and thus fewer constitutional breaches. 
To help decide if this third condition obtains, it is useful to char-
acterize gain and loss as two sides of a continuum, with the left side 
of the continuum consisting of cases where the incriminating value 
of the seized evidence (the gain) exceeds the harm inflicted by the 
unconstitutional search and with the right side of the continuum 
consisting of cases where the harm inflicted exceeds the incriminat-
 
 55. See Becker, supra note 32. 
 56. See supra note 53; Maclin, supra note 13, at 45. 
 57. Damages claims for Fourth Amendment violations are both infrequent and appar-
ently inadequate. See Kamisar, supra note 13, at 563; Maclin, supra note 13, at 62–65. 
 58. Professor Barnett has discussed the parameters for the amount of the award. See 
Barnett, supra note 2, at 977–80. 
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ing value of the evidence.59 Enforcement activity under the exclu-
sionary rule is instigated by private action: the defendant’s decision 
to seek suppression of evidence on constitutional grounds. The larg-
est possible amount of deterrence that could be created by that deci-
sion would be in cases at or near the extreme left side of the contin-
uum, where gain is larger than loss. There the disproportion between 
the prosecution’s evidentiary gain and harm inflicted is greatest, and 
the successful claim would carry the largest penalty to the prosecu-
tion.60 Moreover, criminal defendants could be relied on to seek ex-
clusion in these cases. Because defendants would have enhanced mo-
tivation to request suppression of evidence with higher incriminating 
value, the rule of exclusion would tend to elicit enforcement efforts 
in a cluster on the left side of the continuum. If this explanation is 
correct, then the third condition might obtain, strengthening the 
claim of exclusion’s superiority in producing positive externalities. 
The problem with this explanation supporting the third condi-
tion is that no continuum between gain and loss likely exists. Of 
course, there is a distribution of Fourth Amendment cases along the 
dimension of the degree of suspicion an officer must have to intrude 
in a citizen’s life,61 but this distribution of cases results from a distri-
bution of privacy interests, particularly in the form of property 
rights,62 and not necessarily according to the level of harm or intru-
sion visited upon the citizen by the officer.63 An officer can intrude in 
 
 59. Posner has suggested that Fourth Amendment law can be plotted along a scale that 
balances the level of intrusion with the evidentiary value of the search. See POSNER, supra note 
17, § 28.1; Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 
75. 
 60. This proposition assumes that the harm to the defendant from the illegal search is 
for all practical purposes equal to the prosecution’s gain from that search—not gain in the form 
of evidence obtained, but rather gain in the form of saved labor costs. If this assumption is in-
correct, then intractable problems of the subjectivity or incomparability of gain and harm 
emerge, made more complex because different groups enjoy the gain and experience the harm. 
See generally Barnett, supra note 2, at 946–47. 
 61. See Stuntz, Fourth Amendment Privacy, supra note 48; see also Stuntz, Privacy’s 
Problem, supra note 48. 
 62. See Stuntz, Fourth Amendment Privacy, supra note 48; see also Stuntz, Privacy’s 
Problem, supra note 48. 
 63. A search of a space where a homeless person lives can be intensely intrusive yet pro-
ceed without cause because no recognized privacy interest is invaded. See D’Aguannao v. Gal-
lagher, 50 F.3d 877, 880 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating that a homeless person had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in storing personal items on another’s property without consent). But see 
United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1012, 1015 (8th Cir. 1989) (peering into a closed bathroom 
stall did not violate any reasonable expectation of privacy); Connecticut v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 
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a limited way on a citizen in the public square with no suspicion at 
one end of the continuum64 but needs a judicial warrant supported 
by probable cause to search a home at the other.65 The magnitude of 
loss suffered by the victim of an unconstitutional search and the 
magnitude of evidentiary gain from a search, however, appear to be 
independent.66 There is little reason to assume that the evidentiary 
gain to the prosecution is larger when derived from a low-harm 
search than a high-harm one; in fact, the converse seems more intui-
tively accurate.67 Consequently, it is possible that large-gain cases are 
distributed evenly or randomly across the continuum from low-harm 
to high-harm cases and that any actual bias toward either end is ran-
dom.68 
Adopting the behavioral assumption that defendants are more 
likely to be interested in suppressing evidence when the evidence’s 
incriminating value is higher, then defendants’ motivation to enforce 
their rights will be unrelated to the amount of harm visited upon 
 
145, 152 (Conn. 1991) (holding the opposite when personal items are stored on public prop-
erty). Police may intrusively search an “open field” without cause because no recognized pri-
vacy is at stake, even where the owner has taken extraordinary pains to express his subjective 
interest in actual privacy. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176–77 (1984) (entering 
an “open field” with a locked gate and a “No Trespassing” sign was legal). See generally Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 64. See supra note 48. 
 65. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–17 (1948). 
 66. See supra note 48. 
 67. Assuming zero information costs, police have an incentive to incur greater risk of 
illegality, thus committing marginally greater intrusions on privacy, the higher the expected 
evidentiary gain. Of course, police search in many settings where information is costly and dis-
coveries of valuable evidence is unexpected, and so the positive correlation between loss and 
gain should not be great. Nonetheless, the opposite assumption, which is the third condition 
in the text, would seem implausible. In addition, to the extent that police searches are shaped 
by endowment effects, police might be induced to pursue evidentiary gain even where the 
harm that might result from an unconstitutional act appears of greater comparative value. Po-
lice officers who have lawfully but unfruitfully expended hours searching a house pursuant to 
consent might unlawfully continue that search, even after attempts are made by the resident to 
withdraw consent, in the hope of getting “some evidence” as compensation for the large sunk 
costs already expended in the search. 
 68. One argument in favor of a correlation between high gain and low loss derives from 
marginal analysis. In order for exclusion to provide greater deterrence than would damages, 
gain only needs to exceed loss at the margin, excluding sunk costs. Gain would tend to exceed 
loss where loss is small, and thus if criminal defendants pursue exclusion in these cases, then 
exclusion would extract a larger penalty than would damages measured by loss. But the textual 
conclusion of a random distribution of cases seems more plausible in light of the incentives of 
officers to search more intrusively the higher the expected reward. 
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them in the illegal search.69 Part of the government’s gains from an 
illegal search stem from its avoidance of the costs of adhering to the 
Constitution: the more harmful the illegality, the “cheaper” the price 
to obtain the evidence. As a result, the largest penalty that exclusion 
can assess occurs where a piece of evidence of high probative value 
that was purchased at a large discount is lost to the prosecution. De-
fendants will seek exclusion without regard to the purchase price 
paid for the evidence. Because no correlation necessarily exists be-
tween gain and loss in the area of unconstitutional police activity, en-
forcement activity under the exclusionary rule is likely rather ran-
dom. To create its strongest deterrent effect, the rule of exclusion 
relies on the occurrence of and its application in cases where gain 
and harm are most disproportionate. The exclusionary rule needs 
widely known “exclusionary rule horror stories” to deter effectively. 
The enforcement activity that a damages remedy would generate suf-
fers from the same limitation, only in reverse. Because harm and gain 
from unconstitutional activity appear to be disconnected, the defen-
dant would presumably be motivated to seek the damages penalty 
where the constitutional infraction is most serious and not necessarily 
where the infraction produced the most gain in the form of incrimi-
nating evidence. Damages would provide maximum deterrence in 
cases where loss to the victim far exceeded evidentiary gain but 
would elicit little enforcement expenditures where the converse were 
present. 
As a result, neither exclusion nor a hypothetical damages remedy 
can lay claim to producing superior enforcement activity by the de-
fendant. The remedies operate along different dimensions. The gain-
based remedy of exclusion theoretically promises to produce greater 
positive externalities where gain tends to exceed loss consistently, ei-
ther because of the numerical or absolute superiority of cases involv-
ing gain or where gain would tend to elicit greater enforcement ex-
penditures. However, the employment of gain-based remedies in the 
criminal area appears to be misdirected because criminal wrongdo-
ing, including harms resulting from police wrongdoing, invokes cir-
cumstances where harms will routinely exceed gains. Activity that is 
 
 69. The extent of loss caused by the constitutional invasion may influence the likelihood 
of success of the suppression motion, and thus itself might induce such motions at the margin. 
The point of the argument is not that defendants never have reasons to seek suppression in 
high-gain/low-harm cases but only to point out the doubtfulness of the assumption that they 
would tend to do so in a way systematically biased in favor of such cases. 
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illegal should be illegal in part because it causes more harm than 
good;70 if so, then remedies based on gain will not be sufficiently pu-
nitive to generate adequate social deterrence. The relative infre-
quency with which gain-based remedies, such as restitution, appear 
in the common law of remedies71 suggests their systematic weakness. 
Gain-based remedies should be reserved for those situations in which 
gains exceed losses and do so to such an extent that a loss-based 
remedy is unlikely to elicit desirable enforcement expenditures by the 
aggrieved.72 Loss-based remedies such as damages, conversely, would 
likely produce more deterrence if employed in situations where harm 
tends to exceed gain, a situation that should be more prevalent in the 
criminal law. 
B. Measured by the Risk of Error 
Damages also appears comparatively superior to exclusion along 
another dimension: the relative risk of error. Specifically, despite its 
appearance as a simple remedy to administer,73 exclusion actually is 
more difficult than damages to administer if one’s aim is to generate 
deterrence. Damages produce adequate deterrence by a mere rough 
approximation of actual damages. An approximation suffices because, 
as with any activity that merits the condemnation of law, unconstitu-
tional police actions should as a general matter cause more harm 
than good.74 To restate an earlier supposition, activity that is on bal-
ance socially beneficial is an unlikely target for prohibition;75 as a re-
sult, it seems plausible to assume that the harms stemming from un-
constitutional police conduct on the whole exceed the benefits. 
 
 70. See POSNER, supra note 17, § 7.1. Posner states that most crimes cause loss of utility 
because they involve nonconsensual transfers. Other crimes, however, such as prostitution and 
the drug trade, may be wealth maximizing because the parties are voluntary participants. Id.; 
see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 88–92 (1991). Unconstitutional 
police searches are by definition nonconsensual and thus presumptively not wealth maximizing. 
 71. See Laycock, supra note 3. 
 72. “Son of Sam” laws, which allow crime victims or their surrogates to recover from 
their attackers money made as a result of the crime, present an example of where a suit for loss, 
presumably from the invasion of privacy, would yield a minimal recovery given the fact that the 
criminal prosecution itself already lawfully accomplished that same invasion. See generally 
Benedict J. Caiola & Esther Oz, Note, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York 
State Crime Victims Board—“Crime Goes Hollywood”—The Striking Down of the “Son of Sam” 
Statute, 14 WHITTIER L. REV. 859 (1993) (listing various state initiatives). 
 73. This appearance will be discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 155–61. 
 74. See infra text accompanying note 167. 
 75. See POSNER, supra note 70. 
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Indeed, in the case of a prohibition of criminal or constitutional di-
mension, it may safely be supposed that the courts or Constitution 
Framers determined that harm substantially exceeds gain.76 If it is 
true that harm generally exceeds gain, then a penalty measured by 
loss will deter adequately (assuming adequate enforcement),77 and 
will do so even if the penalty is set somewhat too high or too low.78 
The greater the amount by which losses exceed gains respecting the 
activity, the more comfortable a judge can be with underestimating 
damages.79 
By contrast, a gain-based remedy such as exclusion depends 
more heavily on accuracy. If gain exceeds loss with respect to consti-
tutional violations, it is likely to do so only marginally. As a result, 
the systematic undervaluation of gain might leave police under-
deterred, creating more harm than gain. Should the expected cost to 
the prosecution from a constitutional violation prove small, particu-
larly if wrongfully obtained evidence is admitted by mistake or pur-
suant to an “exception” for unconstitutionally obtained evidence,80 
then “crime” pays.81 Thus, the incentive for judges when ordering 
disgorgement is to protect against undervaluation by overvaluing the 
wrongdoer’s gain and thus increasing over-deterrence of lawful po-
lice activity,82 for example, by defining the causative link between po-
lice illegality and discovered evidence broadly in order to guard 
against under-deterrence of police misbehavior.83 Because of the un-
 
 76. Id. 
 77. See supra text accompanying notes 32–33. 
 78. See JEFFREY S. PARKER, CRIMINAL SENTENCING POLICY FOR ORGANIZATIONS 36–
40 (1988) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Staff Working Paper). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Respecting causation, the Supreme Court has created a series of doctrines, usually 
thought of as “exceptions” to the exclusionary rule, that determine whether a causative link 
connects the evidence at issue with the unconstitutional conduct. These doctrines include at-
tenuation, see Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 689–693 (1982); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 
U.S. 98, 106–10 (1980); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216–19 (1979); Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600–05 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 
(1963), independent source, see Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536–44 (1988); 
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804–805, 813–16 (1984), and inevitable discovery, see 
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445–46 (1984). Courts must also determine which of the un-
constitutionally generated evidence is the product of the “good faith” actions of police officers. 
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918–25 (1984). 
 81. See PARKER, supra note 78. 
 82. See PARKER, supra note 78; Standen, supra note 34, at 187–89. 
 83. The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in fact encourages trial 
judges to consider the egregiousness of police behavior and the needs of deterrence in deciding 
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certain relationship between gain and harm, a remedy based on gain 
risks both under-deterrence and over-deterrence to a greater degree 
than does a remedy based on loss. Systematic under-deterrence is es-
pecially problematic where the wrongdoer’s costs of avoiding harm 
are substantial, as would be the case with any sizable enterprise, such 
as law enforcement, whose agents regularly engage in activities that 
might cause harm. To deter, expected penalties must suffice, not 
only to outsize expected gains, but also to induce the wrongdoer to 
undertake the substantial training and supervisory costs to modify 
the harm-producing behaviors.84 To the extent that exclusion pro-
vides a weaker deterrent to unlawful action than does damages, the 
impetus for widespread police reform is diminished. 
C. Measured by Externalities 
Exclusion does not appear likely to produce sufficient deterrence. 
On the other hand, damages have promise of producing sufficient 
positive externalities to render other means of controlling police be-
havior partially redundant. A private right of action for damages to 
enforce the constitutional standard against wrongful police conduct 
could replace extant public sanctions,85 such as administrative regula-
tion. 
In theory, damages should deter perfectly.86 Damages are meas-
ured by the loss defendant caused plaintiff, requiring the defendant 
to pay plaintiff not only compensates the plaintiff but also fully inter-
nalizes all the losses defendant has caused by his action.87 Assuming 
that the plaintiff’s losses exceed the defendant’s gains, as they pre-
sumptively would given the legal prohibition,88 then a simple  
 
 
whether or not to suppress evidence. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491 (attenuation); Murray, 
487 U.S. at 536–44 (independent source). 
 84. See Standen, supra note 34, at 187–88. 
 85. This reasoning appears relevant as well to private causes of action more generally. See 
Burnette v. Wahl, 588 P.2d 1105 (Or. 1978) (discussing a private cause of action based on 
criminal prohibition of child abandonment). 
 86. This proposition assumes away measurement problems. To the extent that normal 
valuation measures cannot measure loss accurately, such as in defamation cases, damages might 
not provide a sufficient penalty even assuming adequate detection rates. Presumed damages or 
punitive damages can be justified as a response to this problem. See generally David Anderson, 
Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747 (1984). 
 87. For a seminal discussion of optimal penalties, see Becker, supra note 32. 
 88. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
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damages award will remove opportunities to profit from the prohib-
ited activity. 
Damages might not deter optimally, however, if detection occurs 
at a probability substantially less than unity.89 In other words, where 
persons injured by defendant’s conduct do not sue and collect be-
cause of mistake, evidence problems, or financial concerns about the 
cost of a suit in comparison to the value of the recovery, an award of 
simple damages will not provide adequate deterrence.90 For example, 
in the area of criminal remedies where detection problems are ram-
pant, penalties are determined by use of a “multiplier” that is the 
product of the loss of the victim and the inverse of the detection 
rate.91 A penalty smaller than the product would actually make crime 
pay. 
Were a private damages remedy to supplant exclusion as the pre-
ferred remedy for wrongful police behavior, it should be the sole 
remedy applied, except in response to detection problems or particu-
lar harms.92 The proposition that damages will in most cases present 
a superior alternative93 does helpfully locate the incidence of the cost 
of litigation on the parties who stand to gain from its collection, sav-
ing public agencies enforcement expenditures.94 To the extent that 
damages create positive externalities, however, then arguably the 
public ought to subsidize them. One significant subsidy to damaged 
plaintiffs is the judicial system itself;95 another is the availability of 
class actions, which help overcome financial problems and might be 
useful to respond to systemic police abuses.96 Perhaps other means of 
 
 89. See Becker, supra note 32. 
 90. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1193 (1985). 
 91. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.6 (1994). 
 92. Of course, certain police misbehaviors might be of a nature to be incommensurable 
with monetary fines. See Posner, supra note 90; see generally Margaret Jane Radin, Compensa-
tion and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993). Likewise, exclusion as a remedy could 
be retained for instances where police abusively or intentionally violate the Constitution to ob-
tain evidence that in retrospect is of evidentiary value substantially in excess of the price of the 
harm. 
 93. See Posner, supra note 90. 
 94. This assumes that fee-shifting would not be part of the damages scheme. It could be 
added to the public subsidies that already are devoted to the judicial system. 
 95. See POSNER, supra note 17, § 19.1; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal 
Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 271–75 (1976). 
 96. A class action would have been a preferable remedy for the allegedly widespread use 
in the 1970’s of carotid or “choke” holds by the Los Angeles Police Department, predomi-
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subsidizing plaintiffs, such as employing presumed damages,97 would 
be necessary to ensure that the damages penalty is extracted in an 
amount equal to the marginal social benefit.98 To the extent that de-
tection problems persist despite subsidization, then other remedies, 
such as punitive damages, public fines, incarceration, or regulatory 
measures could be taken to address lingering negative externalities. 
Public sanctions would also be needed to deal with defendants who 
cannot pay their bills and who would go undeterred by the prospect  
 
 
 
nately against minority citizens. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). Lyons’ 
suit asked for an injunction, which was denied on the grounds of a lack of a sufficient threat to 
the plaintiff of the police choking him again in the future. Had the issue arisen in the context 
of a criminal prosecution against Lyons, the exclusionary remedy would have been useless 
without evidence upon which to act. See also infra note 218. 
 97. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (stating that compensa-
tory damages for defamation are allowed without proof of injury because defamation is pre-
sumed to cause injury); Jeanty v. McKey & Poague, Inc., 496 F.2d 1119, 1121 (7th Cir. 
1974) (allowing damages for humiliation and distress caused by discriminatory refusals to 
lease); Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1974) (allowing damages for 
humiliation caused by discriminatory refusals to sell); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 84–88 (3rd 
Cir. 1965) (allowing damages for humiliation and distress caused by unlawful arrests, searches, 
and seizures); Sexton v. Gibbs, 327 F. Supp. 134, 142–43 (N.D. Tex. 1970), aff’d, 446 F.2d 
904 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972) (same); Rhoads v. Horvat, 270 F. 
Supp. 307 (D. Colo. 1967) (upholding $5,000 award for illegal arrest); Roland F. Chase, An-
notation, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Resulting from Racial, Ethnic, or Reli-
gious Abuse or Discrimination, 40 A.L.R. 3d 1290 (1971). In Basista, the court held that 
nominal damages could be awarded for an illegal arrest even if compensatory damages were 
waived and that such nominal damages would, in an appropriate case, support an award of pu-
nitive damages. 340 F.2d at 87–88. Alternatively, the damages tariff could be measured by the 
saved labor costs the police enjoyed by foregoing a more costly yet legally permissible course of 
conduct. Setting damages according to saved labor costs is actually a form of restitution. See 
Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652, 654–55 (Wash. 1946) (awarding restitution of 
defendant’s saved labor costs where defendant converted and put to profitable use the plain-
tiff’s egg washing machine). See Standen, supra note 34, at 176–77; Thomas S. Ulen, The Effi-
ciency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. 
REV. 341, 356–57 (1984) (asserting “that, in general, it is extremely inexpensive to measure 
damages in terms of benefit conferred, especially in comparison to the other damage measures 
available to the courts”). 
 98. A damages action for nonsystemic police misconduct should be streamlined, featur-
ing presumed damages, easy collection, and a non-jury decision maker, as in an arbitration. 
Such a process would overcome concerns about jury bias in favor of police officers and about 
financing the litigation. Systemic misconduct or isolated egregious misconduct could be ad-
dressed through the litigation system. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bu-
reau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 421–27 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (proposing a statu-
tory cause of action that would feature a waiver of sovereign immunity and a quasi-judicial 
tribunal). 
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of a private damages action but not by the possibility of a public 
remedy.99 
Even if damages were not exacted for every constitutional viola-
tion, officers would still have incentives from the prospect of a dam-
ages award to adhere to legal limits. Indeed, in theory, damages 
work so well at generating the positive externality of deterrence that 
in certain instances whether or not damages are actually paid will be 
irrelevant to the creation of adequate deterrence. For instance, in de-
ciding whether to impose a nuisance on his neighbor, a defendant 
will compare the gain to be made by not stopping the nuisance 
(measured by precautionary costs avoided) with the gain to be made 
by extracting a payment from the neighbor who might wish to avoid 
being the recipient of that nuisance. The neighbor’s payment will be 
an amount up to that neighbor’s losses from the nuisance. Every 
choice includes a cost. By committing the nuisance, the defendant 
foregoes a chance to collect from the neighbor. Thus, the potential 
damages remedy, which is equal to the potential payment from the 
neighbor, influences the defendant’s conduct even where payment is 
not actually made. In other words, the incidence of collection of 
damages is not significant to their deterrent effect because the real 
deterrent effect does not come from the damages remedy but comes 
from the utility of persons who might be willing to pay the defen-
dant more for not breaking the law than he might gain from break-
ing it. Foregoing this payment is an opportunity cost, and the job of 
the courts in this view is to help parties overcome transaction costs 
that might impede the accurate pricing and transmittal of those costs 
to relevant persons. Thus, objections as to the practicality of wide-
spread damages collections should not in theory diminish the ability 
of a damages remedy to produce positive externalities. Damages are 
really a surrogate for the utility preferences of plaintiffs, and, absent 
transactions costs, the latter can and do deter all by themselves. 
In the context of search and seizure, the prospect of police exact-
ing tribute from citizens for forgoing unlawful activity is anathema, 
and illegal. But an officer might internalize citizens’ opportunity 
costs in other ways: even where the department does not lose a case 
brought by a citizen, the officer might be subject to discipline for his 
actions. In any event, a streamlined damages remedy for wrongful 
 
 99. This concern would be obviated were the municipality or police department liable in 
respondeat superior. See infra notes 138–39. 
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police conduct, available regardless of the fortuity of wrongfully ac-
quired evidence, would in theory suffice to minimize detection prob-
lems and thus negate the need for multipliers. 
III. A GAME THEORY ANALYSIS: THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA 
The prisoner’s dilemma, the basic model of game theory,100 pre-
sents a tale of how legal rules that encourage competition thereby 
inhibit the maximization of joint returns.101 Application of this much-
studied model of strategic behavior102 to the interactions between po-
lice officers and suspects suggests that exclusion is less likely than 
damages to encourage desired cooperative behavior. 
A. The Payoff Matrix and Dominant Strategies 
The prisoner’s dilemma is relevant to police-citizen interaction 
because that interaction is interdependent.103 In other words, the of-
ficer knows that the actions of the citizen will impact the officer’s de-
cisions. Interdependence requires the officer to develop a strategy for 
dealing with the citizen’s decision. The standard payoff matrix in this 
context would compare the payoffs from mutual cooperation with 
those from mutual competition and from each party doing the oppo-
site of the other, in turn. Let “suspect cooperation” be defined as 
granting consent whenever the officer is presently or with reasonable 
additional effort would be entitled to legally conduct the requested 
search. “Officer cooperation” means refraining from requesting con-
sent unless the officer is presently or with reasonable additional effort 
would be legally entitled to conduct the search.104 If players cooper-
ate, there will be no risk of harm from an unconstitutional search, 
and thus the payoff for both is zero. If the citizen defects, refusing to 
give consent although the officer’s planned search is otherwise per-
missible, then the risk of harm increases. The officer, knowing his 
planned search is permissible, nonetheless incurs a small increase in 
 
 100. See generally DOUGLAS C. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994). 
 101. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation 
and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 512 (1994). 
 102. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 53–80, 119–61 (Ox-
ford University Press 1973) (1960); ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 
(1984). 
 103. See BUTLER, supra note 17, at 469. 
 104. By “reasonable additional effort,” I refer to an officer’s obtaining a search warrant, 
assuming the officer already has sufficient cause to merit one. 
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the risk of his search being declared unconstitutional, either by his 
mistaken premise as to its legality or by judicial error. The officer’s 
payoff is set at fifteen; the payoff for suspect, less sure than the officer 
of the legality of the forcible search, measured by the risk of uncon-
stitutionality, is seventy. Where the officer forces a search where the 
citizen would have consented to a search, then the payoffs reverse. 
The officer’s payoff is now seventy, a high risk of unconstitutionality, 
due to his mis-estimation of the citizen’s willingness to consent and 
his zeal, brought about by the suspect’s recalcitrance, to pursue the 
search to conclusion.105 The suspect’s perceived harm is fifteen, as he 
would have consented as a result of his perception that the officer’s 
request was legally justified. Finally, if both players defect, adopting 
nonconsensual postures, then the mutual chances of unconstitutional 
conduct occurring are greater than cooperation, in that the officer 
must act forcibly and the suspect “wrongfully” refuses consent, re-
sulting in payoffs of fifty each. 
 
  Player One (Citizen) 
  Cooperate  Defect 
 
Player Two Cooperate  0/0 15/70 
(Officer) Defect  70/15 50/50 
 
In this game, both players could minimize to the point of vanish-
ing the likelihood of a constitutional violation if they cooperated: if 
the officer asked for consent only when he was otherwise lawfully en-
titled to search and if the citizen granted that request in trustful be-
lief of the officer’s claim of lawful authority. Each is made better off 
individually, however, by defecting: by refusing to consent and com-
pelling the officer to forcible action, the citizen increases to seventy 
the chances of unconstitutionality and exclusion of incriminating 
evidence. The dominant strategy for the citizen is to deny or mislead 
the officer in the hope of evading the search, thus inducing the offi-
cer to get a warrant or use an “exception” to complete the forcible 
search. Similarly, because the officer cannot be sure that the citizen 
will accede to a request for a consent, but instead might either refuse 
it or mislead the officer by indirection into searching in the wrong 
 
 105. See infra notes 119–20 and accompanying text for a discussion of adverse selection 
problems in this game. 
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places, the officer requesting consent has the incentive to behave as 
if, were consent refused, the search would proceed forcibly,106 
fraudulently inducing the citizen to waive his constitutional rights 
and risking the search being declared unconstitutional.107 Along with 
the decision about whether or not to request and give consent, the 
dilemma also arises with respect to the manner of the search: because 
consent can be revoked at any time during the search,108 the officer 
has the incentive to begin the consensual search as intrusively as pos-
sible, lest evidence be lost,109 while the citizen has the incentive to 
steer the police search to away from incriminating evidence. 
For example, where a citizen refuses the officer’s request to give 
consent for a search of the citizen’s belongings,110 then the officer 
knows that the “cost” of his decision to search without consent will 
yield an expected outcome from that search that differs from a con-
sensual search. The relative cost of the evidence increases because 
proceeding forcibly without consent increases the likelihood that the 
search will be found unconstitutional. By the same token, from the 
citizen’s vantage, the costs of a forcible search are greater than one 
that proceeds consensually, in that the chances for unconstitutional 
invasions are heightened.111 As a result, the officer and the citizen 
would maximize joint returns, measured by reducing the likelihood 
of unconstitutional conduct from the interaction, if both cooperated 
in ensuring a consensual search that did not transgress constitutional 
 
 106. See United States v. Duran, 957 F.2d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that a plau-
sible threat to obtain warrant does not negate consent); United States v. Talkington, 843 F.2d 
1041, 1048–49 (7th Cir. 1988) (using threats may invalidate consent). 
 107. See United States v. Zapata, 997 F.2d 751, 755 (10th Cir. 1993) (describing how a 
Hispanic male construed request to search as threatening physical harm). 
 108. Consent operates as a waiver of constitutional rights but can be limited in scope, see 
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991), and is revocable at any time by the citizen, see 
United States v. Springs, 936 F.2d 1330, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (explaining that even after 
consent to search is initially given a person may subsequently limit or withdraw that consent). 
 109. For an extreme example, see United States v. Blake, 888 F.2d 795, 796–97 (11th 
Cir. 1989), where officers approached the defendant while he was walking through an airport 
terminal. Immediately after Blake gave consent to a search of his “person,” one officer reached 
into Blake’s groin region and performed a “frontal touching” of Blake’s genitals. See also 
United States v. Berke, 930 F.2d 1219, 1222–23 (7th Cir. 1991) (consenting to “look” in bag 
allowed thorough search of the bag); United States v. Ibarra, 948 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 
1991) (consent to search the “house” included entering attic with a sledgehammer). 
 110. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 111. Consent operates functionally as an exception to the Fourth Amendment. As long as 
consent is given without inducement or coercion, police may search without fear of transgress-
ing the Constitution. See id. at 222. 
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boundaries. The dominant strategy, however, is to the contrary, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of unconstitutionality to a degree 
greater than mutual cooperation. 
B. Resolving the Dilemma 
The dilemma might be avoided or minimized if both parties un-
derstood that the other would act lawfully and cooperatively. Thus, 
if the citizen could trust the officer to disclose honestly whether or 
not the officer had sufficient grounds to conduct the search in the 
absence of consent and to limit the search to areas lawfully within 
the scope of the consent, then the citizen by giving consent would 
avoid the unnecessary harms to his constitutional rights or property 
interests. Similarly, if the officer could trust the citizen to accede to a 
lawful claim of authority and not mislead the officer or withdraw 
consent, then the officer would minimize the scope of and the harm 
from the search. By leaving the officer and the citizen to react in the 
midst of imperfect knowledge of the other’s strategy, however, then 
each player has the incentive to act competitively in the hope of 
“winning” the game by tricking the citizen into consent on the one 
hand or misleading the officer on the other. 
The prisoner’s dilemma is not simply a problem of information 
costs, however.112 Even if the information costs were reduced to zero 
and each party knew that the other would behave cooperatively, the 
dominant strategy would still be to “cheat”: officers and citizens 
could trade on the other’s trust to reduce their losses from the 
game.113 Because both officers and citizens are “one-shot players” in 
this game, neither will be overly concerned about the reputational 
effects that might induce cooperative behavior.114 The competitive 
behavior that is so dominant in police-citizen interactions is a prod-
uct of the legal rules themselves. Given that the substantive rules of 
the game, being embedded in the federal Constitution, are unlikely 
 
 112. See BUTLER, supra note 17, at 474. 
 113. For example, a citizen whom the officer believes will not mislead the officer in his 
search can maximize his return by misleading the officer. 
 114. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 101, at 521. The textual statement must be 
qualified in recognition that the officer will likely experience some reputational costs should he 
repeatedly flout constitutional standards when interacting with citizens. The officer then is a 
repeat player with judges and police department superiors. This fact will tend to induce the 
officer to act less competitively in seeking evidence from suspects. 
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to change except at the margins of criminal law enforcement,115 the 
question becomes whether the remedy of the exclusionary rule, as 
compared to damages, provides the players with greater incentives 
toward cooperative behavior or competitive behavior. 
It seems likely that exclusion promotes competitive behavior, 
thus inducing constitutional violations. To an officer, the penalty of 
exclusion appears small.116 Should the officer, faced with a refusal or 
withdrawal of consent by a citizen, press on to complete an arguably 
unlawful search, then the worst that can happen is that the gain from 
that search will have to be returned to the citizen.117 In many cases, 
of course, no evidence will be found at all, thus leaving the citizen 
with little practical remedy given the minuteness of actual dam-
ages.118 An officer’s incentives would appear to be to proceed with 
the search or, alternatively, use threats to induce consent in the hope 
that the unconstitutional police action can evade detection, either 
through its failure to culminate in evidence or through the search’s 
fitting one of the numerous exceptions for warrantless police 
searches. The officer has little reason to withdraw when consent is 
 
 115. One significant area where the rules have changed is regulatory and administrative 
searches, where citizen consent is presumed by statute and the scope and manner of police 
searching is also limited. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) 
(drug testing of employees); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (search of auto junk 
yard). 
 116. The remedy is not cost-free, however. The officer’s search costs are lost, the prose-
cutor wastes effort in defending the evidence, and society marginally loses law enforcement 
utility. See POSNER, supra note 17, § 28.2. It is likely that these costs would not be very impor-
tant to the officer when searching. The search costs are sunk and the other costs are borne by 
others. Police department discipline, however, could impose those costs directly on the miscre-
ant officer, thus changing the officer’s incentive structure. This essay does not assume a world 
free of police department discipline but only notes that this discipline, which presumably varies 
in its severity and regularity among departments, can and does reduce the incentives that oth-
erwise propel the officer toward risking unconstitutional intrusions. See Anthony G. Amster-
dam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 409–37 (1974). The 
point in the text is to show how the officer-citizen interaction itself militates in the opposite 
direction, toward competition, and how the exclusionary remedy perversely exacerbates that 
tendency. 
 117. Much evidence, such as contraband or fruits of a crime, is not actually returned to 
its owner, although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permit a motion to return evi-
dence. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e). A motion to suppress is directed at the use of the evidence, 
not its return. See id. 41(f). 
 118. Citizens do have several private civil remedies for unconstitutional police conduct, 
including common law tort actions for trespass and false arrest, civil rights actions under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, and constitutional torts brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See infra notes 138–39. 
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refused. Exclusion also provides the citizen with incentives to com-
pete. If the suspect can induce the officer to search forcibly or to 
make threats to coerce consent, then the citizen has an increased 
chance of having incriminating evidence excluded. 
Exclusion’s tendency to evoke competitive behavior is exacer-
bated by its concomitant tendency to induce adverse selection.119 The 
citizen’s incentives to induce a constitutional violation increase as the 
incriminating character of the evidence he possesses increases. The 
citizen’s best way to induce a violation is to refuse consent. The offi-
cer, suspecting correctly that those with the most to hide have the 
greatest reason to choose not to consent, is inclined to press on all 
the more in the face of the refusal.120 Thus, where the citizen knows 
that the officer seeks and the citizen is in possession of highly in-
criminating evidence, then the players each assume the worst of each 
other and propel their way toward behavior that risks unconstitu-
tionality. The incentives to compete create difficult evidentiary issues 
of constitutional dimension. 
Alternatively, a damages remedy, appropriately streamlined and 
measured by the significance of the constitutional violation,121 would 
encourage the players toward cooperative conduct. An officer, con-
sidering a citizen’s refusal to give consent, would be less inclined to 
issue threats or go forward with a forcible search for fear that his ac-
tions would be deemed unconstitutional and result in a monetary 
fine. A fine, unlike exclusion, would be a real cost to the officer or a 
person or institution in the best position to correct his behavior.122 
The officer’s incentive to adhere to the Constitution would be pre-
sent regardless of whether or not incriminating evidence was likely to 
be or actually was obtained from the search, as damages for loss of a 
 
 119. “Adverse selection” is defined as: “A situation in which two people might trade with 
each other and one person has relevant information about some aspect of the product’s quality 
that the other person lacks.” BUTLER, supra note 17, at 913. It is associated with the “lemon 
effect,” in which the prices and quality of used goods are driven down because buyers cannot 
distinguish superior from inferior products. 
 120. Game theorists refer to this phenomenon as a “pooling equilibrium”: although the 
players may have differing preferences with regard to giving consent to search, the signal that 
the officer infers from a refusal to give consent (that the citizen is in fact holding incriminating 
evidence) propels the officer to demand more consents and propels citizens to give them in 
order to mask their guilt. See generally BAIRD ET AL., supra note 100. 
 121. A system of presumed damages would suffice here and would save significant trans-
actions costs on assessing damages for loss of a constitutional right. 
 122. See infra notes 138–41 and accompanying text. 
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constitutional right would be available in all cases of violations. On 
the other side, the citizen would not have a moral hazard to ad-
versely select refusal when he has incriminating evidence to hide: the 
citizen cannot gain disproportionately from the search being charac-
terized as unconstitutional. Instead, because the aim of the damages 
remedy would be to make the citizen whole through substitution of 
money and not through restoration of the seized evidence, the citi-
zen would not view the inducement of an unconstitutional police 
search as an opportunity to profit. In short, the damages remedy, by 
separating the gain from a search and the loss from a search, circum-
vents the “interdependence” of the officer’s and citizen’s decision-
making.123 A damages remedy for unconstitutional police conduct 
unties the prisoner’s dilemma. 
IV. AGENCY COSTS 
A principal can limit the tendency of his agent to divert from act-
ing in the principal’s interests by incurring monitoring costs.124 The 
standard justification for exclusion highlights its tendency to encour-
age principals to incur monitoring costs.125 Exclusion does not pun-
ish the wrongdoing officer directly; instead, because the state must 
forfeit unlawfully obtained evidence, the costs of the rule are borne 
at the organizational level, by the state and derivatively by law en-
forcement officials and public prosecutors. The officer’s misbehavior 
may be corrected by department censure or other employment ac-
tion; future wrongdoing can be minimized by the imposition of poli-
cies and regulations aimed at eliminating constitutional violations.126 
By visiting the costs of wrongful conduct on those persons best able 
to institute corrective measures, the exclusionary rule places incen-
tives to monitor on precisely those persons, departmental superiors, 
who are in the best position to reform police behavior.127 The exclu-
sionary rule thus encourages superiors to expend resources to mini-
mize agent divergence in order to reduce costly violations. The ex-
 
 123. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 124. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Jensen and Meck-
ling also include “bonding expenditures by the agent” and “residual lost” along with “moni-
toring expenditures” as the components of agency costs. Id. at 308. 
 125. See, e.g., Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 14, at 394–401. 
 126. See Amsterdam, supra note 116, at 420–29. 
 127. Id. 
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clusionary remedy might also help align officer conduct with social 
costs.128 Officers properly following departmental preferences in de-
ciding how close to the line of illegality they might risk going will 
then consider both the social benefits and social costs of their con-
duct, as both the gain in the form of evidence and the costs in the 
form of exclusion are borne by the same party. 
The standard account of damages is less optimistic. In contrast 
with exclusion, a damages remedy would not align officer incentives 
with social efficiency. An officer faced with personal liability for ille-
gal conduct129 would have to undertake the full costs of an illegal 
search, in the form of a personal damages judgment, without con-
comitantly enjoying the social or organizational benefits of enhanced 
prosecutorial advantages and concomitant crime suppression.130 As a 
result, officers would prefer to steer well short of the line of illegality, 
even to the point where legally permissible searches, particularly 
those conducted without the protection of the warrant, were 
avoided. This problem of over-deterrence131 would be exacerbated 
because the officer is paid on salary and not by a successful apprehen-
sion and prosecution.132 Indeed, an officer facing only the downside 
risk might even reduce his activity level to avoid entire categories of 
searches that tend to be the riskiest at incurring personal penalties.133 
 
 128. To use Jensen and Meckling’s terminology, exclusion might encourage officers to 
incur “bonding costs” to help assure the principal that they will adhere to departmental regula-
tions. See supra note 124. Such costs for police officers would be comprised of signaling fidelity 
to codes of conduct, contractual limitations in the range of the officer’s power, and bonding or 
insurance. 
 129. See infra text accompanying notes 164–71. 
 130. See Richard A. Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal 
Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV. 635 (1982). Posner writes: 
Police and other law-enforcement personnel are compensated on a salaried rather 
than piece-rate basis, so that even if they perform their duties with extraordinary zeal 
and effectiveness they do not receive financial rewards commensurate with their per-
formance. At the same time, if their zeal leads them occasionally to violate a person’s 
constitutional rights, then the tort remedy will impose on these officers the full so-
cial costs of their error. There is thus an imbalance: zealous police officers bear the 
full social costs of their mistakes through the tort system but do not receive the full 
social benefits of their successes through the compensation system. 
Id. at 640. 
 131. See Arnold Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 
81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1263–72 (1983). 
 132. See Posner, supra note 59, at 65. 
 133. See Levmore & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 490. 
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It is not clear that exclusion better resolves agency problems.134 
Respecting over-deterrence, exclusion also likely induces police to 
avoid arguably unlawful behavior for fear it be recharacterized as un-
constitutional.135 Exclusion in some cases might constitute a large 
penalty, as evidence that could have been obtained legally with 
greater effort will be lost to the prosecution. Large penalties tend to 
discourage legal activity if it lies close to the line of illegality. More-
over, agent divergence can be exacerbated to the extent that the 
penalty is disproportional to the gain. Compared to exclusion, dam-
ages are precise. Even ballpark assessments of damages, measured by 
harm to the suspect or saved labor costs by the police, marginalize 
deterrence: a graduated range of penalties would provide officers 
who contemplate potentially unconstitutional activity with the incen-
tive to select the least intrusive means of accomplishing the activity, 
in order to minimize the expected penalty. At the border between 
 
 134. For an argument that the agency problem leads officers to ignore certain costs of 
exclusion, see Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 
U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 376–78 (citing sociological literature for the proposition that the officer 
cares primarily about making the arrest and not about trial outcomes). 
 135. One notable example can be derived from the O.J. Simpson prosecution. The facts 
are related in AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 280–81 (Stephen 
A. Saltzburg & Daniel J. Capra eds., 5th ed. 1996). Upon arriving at Simpson’s house in the 
aftermath of the discovery of the bodies of the murder victims, officers had to decide whether 
or not to scale Simpson’s fence and enter his house without a warrant. The possible justifica-
tion for this police intrusion was that of exigency: that the potential danger to human life, were 
Simpson or some other person in the house injured, allowed police to enter without magistra-
tial approval. The officers, as they considered whether or not to enter the house, believed that 
Simpson himself was a prime suspect in the murders; presumably, the officers also were aware 
of the fact that the house could potentially contain significant evidence incriminating Simpson. 
If the officers concluded that an exigency existed but the search was subsequently held uncon-
stitutional, then important incriminating evidence possibly would have been irretrievably lost 
to the prosecution. The Supreme Court has devised certain “exceptions” to the rule of exclu-
sion that potentially could have allowed the introduction of the Simpson evidence, even had it 
been unconstitutionally obtained. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 440–50 (1984) (admit-
ting unconstitutionally obtained evidence because its discovery by police was inevitable). In 
this case and others, any police officer who comes to believe he is facing an exigency must bal-
ance that belief against the possible loss of evidence from exclusion and, to be safe, might take 
the conservative approach and avoid activity that, although legal, carries a risk of recharacteri-
zation. Exigency arises in a variety of cases and situations. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 
287 (1984) (fire scene investigation provides exigency); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 
(1978) (exigent circumstances involving murder scene preservation); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); O’Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(same); United States v. Salava, 978 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1992) (risk to public safety); United 
States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1990) (risk of evidence destruction); United 
States v. Riccio, 726 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1984) (risk to resident or family). 
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constitutional and unconstitutional conduct, the quantum of harm if 
the conduct be deemed unconstitutional should be small: conduct 
that causes large and egregious harms is probably clearly illegal. If so, 
then the amount of over-deterrence from damages should itself be 
small, as the small penalty at the border will not cause much trepida-
tion in the officer approaching it. Exclusion, conversely, features no 
gradation in penalty: it requires disgorgement, regardless of the 
magnitude of the value of the evidence and regardless of the degree 
of harm inflicted.136 The distribution of exclusion’s penalty to officers 
is likely distributed randomly across the continuum of harms.137 If so, 
the officer acting in the borderland of unconstitutionality risks losing 
all the gain should his conduct be characterized as unconstitutional. 
This potentially substantial penalty risks discouraging lawful police 
activity. 
To the extent that organizational liability is thought preferable 
for deterring unconstitutional police action, moreover, a damages 
remedy could be shaped to replicate exclusion.138 Police departments 
and municipalities could be held liable in respondeat superior for of-
ficer misconduct.139 Alternatively, municipalities could indemnify of-
ficers for damages judgments.140 Either approach would induce supe-
riors to monitor or train subordinate officers in order to minimize 
constitutional violations. Either would induce officers to consider, as 
much as would exclusion, the social costs of their conduct prior to 
risking an unconstitutional action. Thus, exclusion does not seem to 
 
 136. The magnitude of the penalty of exclusion likely results in variations in the substan-
tive standard of liability, here in definitions of the Fourth Amendment, in an attempt to mollify 
the effects of an otherwise over-penalizing remedy. 
 137. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
 138. Various tort remedies exist for officer misconduct in connection with arrests, impris-
onment, searches, and seizures, including 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the common law torts of false 
arrest, false imprisonment, trespass, assault, and battery. See SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL 
RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION § 4:17 (4th ed. 1999). These remedies are some-
times unavailable, however, due to the difficulty of proving actual damages. See Norwood v. 
Bain, 43 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998) (no physical damage from unconstitutional search). The 
Supreme Court has also implied a cause of action for damages against federal officers who vio-
late the Fourth Amendment. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 139. Local governments, but not states, may be sued without violating the Eleventh 
Amendment. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Such liability, however, 
is limited to where the constitutional violation resulted from an official policy, custom, or 
training practice. See generally NAHMOD, supra note 138, at Chapter 6. 
 140. See POSNER, supra note 17; Posner, supra note 90. 
4STA-FIN.DOC 12/9/00  1:35 PM 
1443] The Exclusionary Rule and Damages 
 1473 
have a necessary advantage over a flexible damages remedy. Indeed, 
comparing institutional processes,141 damages assessed against the po-
lice agency might in fact generate superior monitoring incentives as 
compared to exclusion. Exclusion creates deterrence of police mis-
conduct indirectly, relying on the prosecutor complaining about lost 
evidence to his superior who in turn complains to police department 
officials who then attempt to alter the behavior of subordinate offi-
cers. Complaints about lost evidence that travel directly from prose-
cutor to police officer probably do not carry much weight, especially 
in large cities where individual officers are likely to be one-time play-
ers who will not deal repeatedly with particular prosecutors. A dam-
ages remedy assessed directly against the police department budget, 
however, might more directly give department officials incentives to 
monitor subordinate officers. It also helpfully eliminates the office of 
the prosecutor from participating in monitoring police officers, thus 
reducing the transaction costs of producing deterrence. 
 Damages would appear to have one other advantage over ex-
clusion in encouraging effective monitoring: diminished variance. In 
theory, compensatory or presumed damages geared to the nature 
and severity of the constitutional invasion could be collected in every 
instance of unconstitutional conduct, unlike exclusion, where the 
remedy for unconstitutional conduct depends on the fortuity of the 
discovery of incriminating evidence. Because the assessment of the 
damages penalty would be more consistent, not depending on the 
discovery and successful suppression of evidence, damages would re-
duce the variance in penalties from the illegal search. Reducing the 
variance inhibits risk-taking, particularly for those officers who might 
be risk-seekers in the domain of gain. Making a damages penalty 
more of a sure thing minimizes the chances of gain and frames the 
outcome as a loss, thereby utilizing the general risk-avoidance of per-
sons toward losses. 
Narrowing the variance in outcomes also cheapens the expense 
for the municipality or the officer to obtain insurance, as the risk 
pool for certain kinds of officer behaviors can be better defined.142 
Encouraging the provision of insurance assists claimants in obtaining 
 
 141. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994). 
 142. See generally George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 
96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987). 
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recovery while minimizing the costs to the government. By contrast, 
the social costs from exclusion appear impossible to insure against di-
rectly, in part due to the wide variance in the “value” of suppressed 
evidence. The value or costs take the form of diminished punishment 
of offenders and potentially an increase in crime, both from lessened 
deterrence and recidivism, neither of which appears to provide insur-
ers with a sufficiently defined risk pool to permit insurance.143 
V. ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Exclusion does not appear to have clear advantages over damages 
in terms of administrative simplicity, as some have argued.144 Clearly 
the successful implementation of a damages remedy for wrongful po-
lice conduct presents conceptual and practical obstacles.145 But once 
again the attack on damages overlooks the fact that choices are com-
parative. Exclusion presents implementation problems that appear as 
serious as those respecting damages. 
The primary weakness cited by commentators with regard to the 
damages remedy is the problem of measurement.146 The problem of 
measurement refers to the difficulty of assigning a monetary figure to 
the loss of a constitutional right, an item generally without a readily 
available market price.147 A system of damages that graduated mone-
tary penalties according to harm, even if theoretically appealing as a 
way to create optimal deterrence, could not practically be imple-
mented because harms of this variety could not easily nor accurately 
be quantified. Consequently, the remedy of exclusion, which 
straightforwardly suppresses evidence without the need to translate 
 
 143. To the extent the government fails to minimize agency costs, resulting in more con-
stitutional violations, more excluded evidence, and thus more social costs of crime, then the 
burden of undertaking precautionary costs falls to citizens at large. People can guard against 
such events through expenditures on public safety and private security or through specific in-
surance against certain crimes, such as burglary. See Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat’l 
Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W. 2d 271 (Minn. 1985). 
 144. See Levmore & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 490–95 (arguing that practical or adminis-
trative advantages provide the primary advantage of exclusion over damages); Meltzer, supra 
note 2; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 14. 
 145. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 14, at 406–10; Meltzer, supra note 2. 
 146. See Levmore & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 490–95. 
 147. This problem is essentially one of transactions costs impeding the efficient allocation 
of goods or even a problem of proper definition of property. See Coase, supra note 29; Harold 
Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 25–28 (1972); 
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315 (1993). 
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its value into some other medium, presents a simpler and more easily 
applied method of responding to police misconduct.148 
This contention ignores the fact that measuring the evidence 
gained from wrongful police conduct presents difficulties as serious 
as those respecting damages. Both involve assessing the results of 
violations of constitutional rights, a notably difficult enterprise.149 
Damages presents two essential difficulties of measurement: es-
tablishing the portions of harm that are attributable to the violation 
(causation) and determining a value for those portions of harm 
(valuation). Respecting damages for unconstitutional police activity 
involving the Fourth Amendment, to determine causation, the judge 
must decide which constitutionally protected interests were vio-
lated,150 a problem that requires information about standing,151 “rea-
sonable expectations of privacy,”152 and the particular facts of the po-
lice activity.153 In order to assess the value of harm, the trier of fact 
would presumably need to know something about the officer’s state 
of mind in committing the violation, the difficulty of pursuing lawful 
means, the victim’s reaction, and the exact extent of the intrusion. 
Such inquiries would be expensive and presumably would yield 
highly disparate outcomes among trials, somewhat frustrating the 
production of graduated penalties necessary for marginal deter-
rence.154 
Exclusion involves difficult problems of causation and valuation 
too. It is not always clear whether or not a certain piece of evidence, 
among the significant body of evidence that might be gathered dur-
ing a large investigation, was discovered as a result of a prior illegal-
ity. Even where the “but-for” causal link has been established, de-
 
 148. See Levmore & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 490–95. 
 149. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257–59 (1978). 
 150. An intrusion into the privacy of a suspect constitutes a constitutional violation only 
if it impinges on the suspect’s “reasonable expectations of privacy.” Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 151. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–38 (1978). 
 152. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 153. The Supreme Court has increasingly made the focus of Fourth Amendment law the 
behavior of police officers and not the officer’s subjective motivation nor the suspect’s indi-
vidualized reaction to the officer’s conduct. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–13 
(1996); see also William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 7–15 (1996). 
 154. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Crimi-
nal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996); George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of 
Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970). 
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termining “proximate causation” remains problematic. The Supreme 
Court has created a series of doctrines, usually thought of as “excep-
tions” to the exclusionary rule, that aim to determine if a causal link 
sufficiently connects the evidence at issue with the unconstitutional 
conduct. These doctrines include attenuation,155 independent 
source,156 and inevitable discovery.157 They essentially provide that 
certain unconstitutionally obtained evidence should not be excluded 
because the unconstitutional act did not lead to or cause the finding 
of the evidence. Application of these doctrines involve the courts in 
difficult doctrinal line-drawing and factual decision-making.158 De-
termining causation in the realm of gain should presumably mirror 
the same determination in the realm of loss, both in scope and diffi-
culty. 
Unlike exclusion, damages also present a distinct valuation prob-
lem. Exclusion does, however, entail a factual issue that might be 
commensurate with valuation in difficulty. Under the exclusionary 
doctrine, not all gain by the prosecution that stems from an uncon-
stitutional activity is excluded: as in the civil remedy of disgorge-
ment, only “unjust enrichments” are deemed wrongful to acquire or 
retain.159 Here, an “unjust enrichment” is one that has not been at-
tained through the officer’s exercise of “good faith.”160 As a result, 
along with resolving the causation issue, trial judges must determine  
 
 
 
 155. See Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 
(1980); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
 156. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988); Segura v. United States, 468 
U.S. 796 (1984). 
 157. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
 158. For example, in the “attenuation” cases, trial judges must determine if “an interven-
ing independent act of a free will” on the part of the suspect took place in order to “purge the 
primary taint of the unlawful invasion.” Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486. In resolving this question, 
the courts are to avoid a simple test, such as whether or not Miranda warnings have been is-
sued. “No single fact is dispositive. The workings of the human mind are too complex, and the 
possibilities of misconduct too diverse, to permit protection of the Fourth Amendment to turn 
on such a talismanic test.” Brown, 422 U.S. at 603. Along with the effect of warnings, courts 
are to consider “[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of in-
tervening circumstances . . . and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official miscon-
duct.” Id. at 603–04. Only if these factors together add up to a conclusion of attenuation is 
the causal chain from the constitutional wrong broken and suppression refused. 
 159. See supra note 3. 
 160. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). 
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which of the unconstitutionally generated evidence is the product of 
the “good faith” actions of police officers.161 
This inquiry into the officer’s state of mind in order to determine 
the amount of the evidentiary gain is likely not as difficult as valuing 
damages, especially to the extent that inquiry is objectified.162 But the 
valuation problems with damages could be rendered no worse in de-
gree than good faith if the damages remedy were set according to a 
preformulated tariff for a certain style or type of unconstitutional po-
lice action.163 Indeed, the law of remedies sometimes uses presumed 
damages, and nominal damages combined with punitive damages, to 
redress torts involving harms to a person’s dignity,164 a type of harm 
that appears analogous to the harm from an unconstitutional 
search.165 The damages tariff could alternatively and perhaps more 
simply be set according to the labor costs saved by the decision of 
police officers to forego a more troublesome constitutional route to 
the desired activity.166 In any event, precision is not needed: a ball-
park damages figure that approximates harm should be adequate to 
deter.167 Damages need not be rejected as the preferred remedy for 
Fourth Amendment violations on account of an easily resolvable 
problem of valuation, one that the law has overcome in other areas 
 
 161. “Good faith” is currently available as a defense to the suppression motion in cases 
where evidence was seized, albeit wrongfully, under the authority of a warrant, see Leon, 468 
U.S. at 922, statute, see Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), or because of an error by court 
clerks, see Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). 
 162. It is unclear to what extent that inquiry involves examination of the officer’s subjec-
tive state of mind or a more objective “reasonableness” standard. See John M. Burkoff, Bad 
Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70 (1982); George C. Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, Bal-
ancing the Fourth Amendment Scales: The Bad Faith “Exception” to Exclusionary Rule Limita-
tions, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 21 (1993). Leon contemplates objective elements in that test: “the 
officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s probable-cause determination and on the technical suffi-
ciency of the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable . . . and it is clear that in some 
circumstances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was 
properly issued.” 468 U.S. at 922–23. 
 163. See infra note 173. 
 164. See supra note 97. 
 165. Both dignitary torts and constitutional torts sometimes cause harm without legal 
redress, or damnum absque injuria. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978) (holding 
that no remedy is warranted for denial of due process without accompanying “actual injury”). 
 166. Setting damages according to saved labor costs is actually a form of restitution. See 
Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946) (awarding restitution of defendant’s 
saved labor costs where defendant converted and put to profitable use the plaintiff’s egg wash-
ing machine); Standen, supra note 34, at 176–77; Ulen, supra note 97. 
 167. See supra notes 73–78 and accompanying text. 
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of tort. Other problems with the damages remedy, such as the added 
costs of civil actions and their unlikely success,168 could be met by 
removing the need for a civil action as a vehicle for enforcement and 
collection. Mirroring the exclusionary remedy, damages in the form 
of a fine payable to the defendant could be ordered by the judge af-
ter a simple hearing during a criminal trial.169 Similar summary pro-
cedures, such as nonlawyer claims arbitration,170 could be established 
for nonindicted victims of unconstitutional searches.171 
Thus, practical considerations do not favor exclusion over dam-
ages. Both remedies have difficult causation and valuation problems. 
At worst, the damages remedy can be structured to duplicate what-
ever practical advantages accompany exclusion.172 A damages remedy 
could provide for easy collection, payment by the state, and pre-
sumed damages or fines that approximate the measure of damages.173 
VI. USE OF EVIDENCE AT TRIAL 
Many have voiced fear that exclusion at bottom allows the guilty 
to go free174 or otherwise constitutes a disproportionate penalty 
against the interests of law enforcement.175 Several commentators 
have refuted this claim, arguing that the constitutional rules them-
selves, and not the remedy, set the boundary for lawful police con-
 
 168. See Levmore & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 490–95. 
 169. In principle and in practice, this approach seems no different than a judge ordering 
monetary restitution to the victim of a crime after a criminal trial. 
 170. See infra note 173. 
 171. Some damages remedies are currently available to the victims of unconstitutional 
searches, including a civil suit against state officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), or against 
federal officials pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388 (1971). These remedies do not tend to attract a sufficient number of plaintiff’s 
attorneys to the cases to warrant sufficient deterrents. See Caleb Foote, Tort Remedies for Police 
Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493, 500 (1955); Meltzer, supra note 2, at 
283–86. 
 172. But see Maclin, supra note 13, at 59–66 (casting doubt on idea that legislatures ever 
would in fact create what they could in theory create respecting a damages remedy for uncon-
stitutional police conduct). 
 173. Several proposals have been offered to create a damages remedy that mirrors the 
virtues, such as entity liability and ease of administration, of the exclusionary rule. See Bivens, 
403 U.S. 388 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (proposing a legislatively created damages remedy that 
would include waiver of sovereign immunity and non-Article III hearings adjudication); Amar, 
supra note 13, at 811–16 (proposing entity liability, abolition of immunity, and punitive dam-
ages); Barnett, supra note 2, at 922–23. 
 174. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 13, at 799. 
 175. See POSNER, supra note 17, § 28.2. 
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duct.176 Any remedy that has the effect of inducing police to act con-
stitutionally will restrict available evidence.177 As a result, even if ex-
clusion is not a superior remedy in terms of deterrence or practical-
ity, at worst it does not change the outcomes of trials, and therefore 
the worries about exclusion are unfounded.178 
This argument, however, overlooks the dynamic relationship be-
tween right and remedy. Different remedies elicit different responses, 
thereby forming the boundaries of the legal rules to which those 
remedies attach.179 Exchanging a damages remedy for exclusion 
could create significantly different outcomes in trials where the evi-
dence that was seized unconstitutionally becomes important to the 
determination of guilt. Damages would allow the prosecution to pay 
for the unconstitutional act of the officer and keep the fruits of his 
search; exclusion in theory would not.180 Disgorgement aims to pro-
hibit wrongful actions by eliminating the expected profit from those 
actions.181 Damages, in contrast, provide optimal deterrence for an 
activity if harm generally exceeds gain. If the latter supposition is cor-
rect and police generally cause more harm by unconstitutional con-
duct than they produce good in the form of otherwise unobtainable 
evidence or saved labor costs,182 then damages would appear to pro-
vide the better remedy to discourage wrongful conduct.183 The pay-
ment of damages will be large enough to discourage the smaller 
gains. But even with this superior discouragement, occasionally cases 
will occur where gain, particularly in the form of evidence, clearly ex-
 
 176. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
Levmore & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 490–95; Loewy, supra note 131. 
 177. See Levmore & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 490–95. 
 178. See id. 
 179. One recognition of this dynamic relationship between remedy and right is evident in 
the argument that a damages remedy could over-deter otherwise lawful police conduct. See 
Posner, supra note 90. 
 180. But see supra notes 155–61 and accompanying text (discussing causation and valua-
tion problems with exclusion). 
 181. Standen, supra note 34, at 218–19. 
 182. See supra text accompanying notes 48–53. 
 183. The contention that police, when they choose to act unconstitutionally, in most 
cases will cause more harm than they will gain does not mean that police tend to act ineffi-
ciently. Assigning to police some degree of rationality would suggest that they usually act to 
maximize gain. The gain they maximize, however, is not necessarily the same gain that exclu-
sion disgorges. Exclusion isolates one type of gain, evidentiary gain. Officers might often act 
with other types of gain in mind to which the rule of exclusion does not respond: gains such as 
crime prevention, officer safety, or local deterrence. 
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ceeds loss. In those cases, the police could elect to act unconstitu-
tionally,184 pay damages for the harm, and use the gained evidence at 
trial. This option is not so obviously available with the remedy of ex-
clusion.185 Whether “high gain-low harm” cases are few or many in 
number, in all those instances where gain to the prosecution exceeds 
harm to the suspect (or saved labor costs), the officer could con-
ceivably act unconstitutionally to gather evidence for use at trial.186 
Damages differ in kind from restitution; while restitution seeks to 
prohibit transactions, damages price them.187 It is this point that 
seems to have led so many commentators, including the Supreme 
Court, to mistakenly conclude that exclusion is the more punitive or 
better deterring remedy. In general, disgorgement appears to be a 
more serious penalty than mere payment of damages only because 
gain likely exceeds harm in the cases in which disgorgement is 
sought.188 But it is misleading to generalize from the isolated case. 
Aggregated restitution extracts a greater penalty from the wrongdoer 
only if, across the run of cases, gain generally exceeds loss. If in fact 
 
 184. It is very unlikely in most cases that police have the prescience at the investigatory 
stage to make such a determination. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 947–60 (offering experiential 
argument to the effect that police will be unlikely to foresee value of evidence at trial). None-
theless, an argument that favors the idea of courts using ill-gotten evidence must consider the 
possibility that, through experience or simply a good guess, in some cases police will elect to 
violate the Constitution for supposed substantial evidentiary gain. 
 185. Exclusion does allow for a form of monetization. Officers can decide at the outset to 
risk exclusion of evidence, a cost, for the substantial gain from an unconstitutional act. All 
remedies at some point can be “priced,” even criminal sanctions. In some cases, the payment 
demanded by exclusion could be high if the evidence seized is lost to the prosecution where it 
could have been used had correct constitutional procedures been followed. The monetization 
afforded by exclusion, however, appears different in kind from that obviously available with 
damages. With exclusion, the “payment” of cost buys only a chance at admission to be decided 
by the court; with damages, the payment buys admission of the evidence. 
 186. In essence, damages provide a “liability rule” to contrast with the “property rule” of 
exclusion. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
 187. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Dis-
appearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 194–95 (1991). 
 188. In the civil arena, where the plaintiff may frame the cause of action in a way that 
maximizes the potential monetary recovery, a suit founded in restitution would per force only 
be brought where the defendant’s gain from the wrongdoing exceeded the loss the plaintiff 
suffered. See Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946) (stating that when a 
damages claim is likely for rental value a restitution claim is measured by the costs defendant 
saved in excess of rental value); Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933) (noting 
that plaintiff’s claim on the contract, measured by loss, was limited by negative expectancy; 
claim for restitution not limited; plaintiff recovered value of expenditures made pursuant to a 
losing contract). 
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loss tends to exceed gain, as argued above,189 then use of restitution 
will create smaller expected penalties, thereby lessening deterrence. 
Thus, a damages remedy could both create a more serious deter-
rent to police wrongdoing than does exclusion while simultaneously 
allowing for the occasional use of unconstitutionally obtained evi-
dence. Remedies only deter; they do not prohibit, although they 
may aim to prohibit.190 Although damages may effectively discourage 
a greater amount of unconstitutional police activity than does exclu-
sion, nevertheless there will be cases where the discouragement fails. 
In those cases, the damages remedy would permit the prosecution to 
use the evidence, impliedly altering trial outcomes; exclusion would 
in theory prohibit the admission of such evidence. 
Once it is understood that damages can allow the prosecution 
and police to price unconstitutional activity and thus use otherwise 
unavailable evidence,191 two problems remain. First, in addition to 
the need to ensure adequate deterrence, the Supreme Court justified 
the imposition of the exclusionary remedy on the grounds that 
courts should not participate in the illegality of police conduct by us-
ing ill-gotten evidence.192 If a damages remedy replaced exclusion 
and prosecutors and police began to monetize unconstitutional con-
duct, then courts would find themselves a party to wrongdoing on a 
more frequent basis.193 The second problem stems from the first. If it 
is true that a damages remedy, although a superior deterrent as com-
pared to exclusion, would in some subset of cases allow the police to 
violate the Constitution and profit, then the remedy of exclusion 
 
 189. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text. 
 190. See Standen, supra note 34, at 148. 
 191. Several other hypotheticals about police behavior also suggest that a change in rem-
edy from exclusion to damages would affect trial outcomes. See Amar, supra note 13, at 793–
95 (providing examples and arguing that exclusion leaves the defendant “better off”). 
 192. This second rationale, expressed in Mapp v. Ohio, has been referred to as the “judi-
cial integrity” principle. It “enabl[es] the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official 
lawlessness.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
This rationale has an uneven history. Although not disavowed, the Court has relegated the 
judicial integrity principle to a “limited” role. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907–
08 (1984); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492–95 (1976). In addition, the Court has recog-
nized that the converse of the principle appears equally valid: that a refusal to admit probative 
evidence also creates disrespect for the judicial system. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 907–08. 
 193. This argument by its own terms assumes that different trial outcomes would result 
due to different evidence depending on whether the Court employed damages or restitution as 
the remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. Thus the “judicial integrity” argument seems to 
contradict the argument that exclusion does not affect trial outcomes. 
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might be combined with a damages remedy to account for all possi-
ble cases. 
A. Judicial Integrity 
The argument about judicial integrity seems unconvincing, both 
on its face194 and from an economic perspective. First, the Supreme 
Court has authorized federal courts to use unconstitutionally ac-
quired evidence in a variety of circumstances, particularly under the 
exceptions to exclusion.195 Limitations on standing permit the prose-
cution to use evidence wrongfully acquired against defendants who 
were technically unharmed by the unconstitutional search.196 Federal 
courts can generally use evidence in criminal cases that was obtained 
in contravention of state law197 or even in violation of federal stat-
utes,198 regulations,199 and rules of procedure.200 Federal courts can 
even use evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment in 
trials and proceedings other than criminal trials,201 even if those pro-
 
 194. Amar, supra note 13, at 792–93. 
 195. See supra notes 155–58 and accompanying text. 
 196. See Akas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–50 (1978); see also United States v. Padilla, 
508 U.S. 77 (1993) (per curiam) (rejecting co-conspirator standing); United States v. Payner, 
447 U.S. 727 (1980) (rejecting standing of “target” of federal investigation); United States v. 
Carter, 14 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1994) (rejecting standing of passenger in a car not belonging 
to him). 
 197. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 54 F.3d 502, 503–04 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that an 
arrest by state officers in violation of state law does not require exclusion in federal prosecu-
tion); United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1987) (evidence seized by 
state officers in violation of state law, but not in violation of federal Constitution, is admissible 
in federal prosecution). 
 198. See United States v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 667 F.2d 510 (6th Cir. 1981) (con-
cerning violation of statute requiring administrative warrant for seizure). 
 199. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979) (concerning violation of Internal 
Revenue Service regulations limiting recording of conversations); United States v. Hensel, 699 
F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1983) (concerning violation of international law and coast guard regula-
tions). 
 200. See United States v. Charles, 883 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1989) (admitting evidence ob-
tained in violation of FED. R. CRIM. P. 41); United States v. Schoenheit, 856 F.2d 74 (8th 
Cir. 1988) (same). 
 201. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (holding that exclusion does not 
apply in immigration proceeding); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (civil tax litiga-
tion); Garrett v. Lehman, 751 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1985) (military discharge proceeding). But 
see One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965) (stating that exclusionary 
rule applies in forfeiture proceeding, otherwise government rewarded directly for illegal 
search). 
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ceedings are part of a criminal case.202 Such evidence can also be used 
for impeachment.203 Finally, because the Court refused to give the 
exclusionary rule retroactive effect,204 scores of convictions were ob-
tained or upheld on the basis of unconstitutionally obtained evi-
dence. Whatever integrity the federal courts may have would not be 
much further eroded by the substitution of damages for exclusion. 
But again, the choice between damages and exclusion must be 
comparative, and exclusion presents no less of a moral dilemma. If it 
is true that a damages remedy would render courts a party to wrong-
doing by allowing the state to use wrongfully acquired evidence, 
then it is also true that the refusal of courts or legislatures to fashion 
a damages remedy to supplant exclusion renders courts a party to 
wrongdoing of a different kind: denying many victims of unconstitu-
tional police searches a practical remedy. Exclusion can be employed 
only where evidence has been obtained; moreover, exclusion can be 
employed effectively only where the loss of such evidence imparts a 
substantial penalty on the prosecution.205 In all other cases, the 
Court’s reliance on exclusion as the primary remedy for unconstitu-
tional police conduct in practical terms precludes victims from the 
bar of justice.206 Exclusion, moreover, seems socially wasteful: it re-
quires that victims who become entitled to the remedy by virtue of 
being named a criminal defendant receive compensation in the form 
of reduced risk of conviction and shortened criminal punishment. To 
the extent that defendants value other goods that money can buy, 
such as family support, more than they value their personal liberty at 
the margin, then exclusion is socially wasteful, resulting in irretriev-
able deadweight loss. As a result, the ability of exclusion to preclude 
the occasional monetization of the Fourth Amendment is purchased 
in the form of a net loss in social deterrence and in compensation to 
victims, both of which have a moral dimension as well. 
 
 202. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (exclusionary rule does not apply in ha-
beas corpus proceedings); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354–55 (1974) (grand 
jury proceedings); United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256 (2d. Cir. 1992) (sentencing). 
 203. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980). 
 204. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 535–39 (1975). 
 205. See supra notes 43–72 and accompanying text. 
 206. Exclusion is unavailable for victims of unconstitutional searches who are not made 
criminal defendants. Even for those who are, exclusion might be a poor remedy if the incrimi-
nating value of the evidence is slight. 
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B. Exclusion and Damages Combined 
Combining exclusion and damages would have the virtue of ap-
pearing to leave no conduct inadequately redressed. Exclusion, as has 
been shown, works well for those cases where evidentiary gain ex-
ceeds harm inflicted, and damages adequately responds to cases in 
which harm exceeds gain;207 each gives rise to practical concerns that 
limit implementation;208 and each potentially place judges in the un-
comfortable role of either using bad evidence or ignoring unconsti-
tutional conduct.209 Given these mirror image problems, it would 
seem plausible to decline to adopt either remedy exclusively but in-
stead to stipulate that the defendant who successfully claims to be 
the victim of an unconstitutional police action is to recover either 
money in the form of damages for his injury or to be entitled to the 
suppression of the evidence in the criminal prosecution against him. 
In short, the victim should recover the gain or loss, whichever is 
greater.210 
This approach is surprisingly feasible. The apparent incom-
mensurability between the value of evidence and the value of an in-
fringed constitutional right211 could be resolved by compelling the 
victim/defendant to elect the remedy: a decision to pursue a dam-
ages remedy would preclude the right to request suppression, and, 
conversely, a decision to pursue exclusion would preclude damages. 
Problems of coordination between separate criminal and civil suits 
could be resolved by appropriate legislation or judicial abstention. In 
theory, the defendant’s choice between the remedies should create 
the strongest possible deterrence of unconstitutional actions: if the 
police chose to cause harm without much derivative gain, they would 
be vulnerable to a damages judgment; if they caused little harm but 
gained substantial evidentiary advantages, they would likely have to 
forego such advantages when exclusion was applied. All incentives to 
violate the Constitution would be diminished. 
 
 
 207. See supra notes 43–72 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra notes 144–73 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra notes 194–204 and accompanying text. 
 210. This is the approach taken in many sections of the federal sentencing guidelines, 
albeit in the context of imposing a penalty on the offender, ostensibly to ensure that the pen-
alty adequately deters in all cases. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
8C2.4(a) (1994). 
 211. See Radin, supra note 92. 
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The problem with this approach is not one of practicality, al-
though there may be more difficulties with implementation than the 
foregoing brief treatment allows. Remedying unconstitutional police 
conduct by allowing the victim an option of damages or exclusion 
appears to grant the criminal defendant too great a remedy, one that 
is unnecessary to the functioning of deterrence. Suspects who are vic-
tims of unconstitutional searches but who are not prosecuted crimi-
nally are limited to a damages remedy; it seems difficult to justify 
why, in certain cases, those victims who are prosecuted criminally 
should have the option of a more valuable remedy for the constitu-
tional violation.212 
But the utilitarian deterrent rationale is indifferent to claims of 
desert: as long as the wrongdoer is penalized sufficiently, then deter-
rence is accomplished regardless of to whom the payment is made. A 
remedy of the greater of gain or loss misapprehends the proper func-
tioning of a damages remedy. In theory, if damages are set equal to 
harm and detection rates are adequate, then the expected penalty 
contemplated by a potential wrongdoer will be sufficient to deter il-
legal activity.213 Rarely will a police officer know ex ante that the 
value of potential evidence from unconstitutional activity will exceed 
the expected penalty. A penalty large enough for the general case will 
by definition render the great majority of unconstitutional searches 
unappealing.214 Most instances where evidentiary gain exceeds loss 
from the unconstitutional search will not be evident until after the 
police activity, when all of the evidence is gathered and its relative 
importance can be assessed.215 If it is true that gain will not appear to 
exceed loss prior to police activity, then granting the criminal defen-
dant the option of exclusion of evidence simply bestows upon the 
defendant a gift, unwarranted by the social need to deter improper 
police conduct. 
 
 
 212. One possible reason that the person who was the object of the search may deserve a 
better remedy is that he finds himself in a worse position than the un-indicted victim. In a case 
where the evidence obtained from the constitutional violation was central to the victim’s in-
dictment, then arguably the defendant has been harmed more from the constitutional violation 
than has the unindicted victim and thus deserves a greater remedy. 
 213. The textual proposition assumes that “illegal activity” indicates activity the net social 
harm from which exceeds the net social gain. 
 214. See Barnett, supra note 2. 
 215. See id. 
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In addition, this gift will not be costless to the giver. The routine 
use of exclusion as an option to damages will diminish the graduated 
or marginal deterrence created by damages set equal to loss. Mar-
ginal deterrence requires that less egregious conduct be treated more 
leniently than more egregious conduct in order to encourage 
wrongdoers to minimize the harm from their conduct.216 While dam-
ages give the wrongdoer the incentive to minimize costs by minimiz-
ing harm, exclusion is binary: either the evidence is admitted or it is 
not. Without liability for damages, the police officer who decides to 
violate the Constitution might as well cause as much harm doing so 
as expedience might dictate, as no greater penalty will result. 
Although no reason presents itself to make exclusion routinely 
available as an alternative to damages, exclusion could be employed 
occasionally, much like the remedy of restitution is in civil law, to re-
spond to egregious situations where the customary deterrence pro-
vided by damages seems to fail;217 for example, where the police 
knowingly and maliciously violate constitutional rights for eviden-
tiary gain when they could have followed constitutional processes 
without extraordinary difficulty. Injunctions might also be consid-
ered to address repeated violations, although the context of criminal 
enforcement might prove a particularly difficult setting for injunctive 
relief.218 
 
 216. See Stigler, supra note 154; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2389–90 (1997). 
 217. See Standen, supra note 34, at 216–25. 
 218. See Amar, supra note 13, at 815–16. Professor Amar expresses optimism at the 
prospect of injunctions as a tool to remedy unconstitutional police conduct. He writes: 
Early prevention is often better than after-the-fact remedy. The Fourth Amendment 
says its right “shall not be violated.” When judges can prevent violations before they 
occur, they should do so—especially if after-the-fact damages could never truly make 
amends. Damages cannot bring back African-American males killed as a result of the 
unreasonable chokehold policy of the Los Angeles police department in the 1970s 
and 1980s. And yet in 1983, the Supreme Court in Los Angeles v. Lyons [461 U.S. 
95 (1983)] prevented federal courts from enjoining various forms of racially dis-
criminatory police brutality. . . . Lyons was a sad entry in the annals of the Fourth 
Amendment. One can only wonder how much of the racial tragedy visited upon Los 
Angeles in recent years might have been avoided had the Supreme Court done the 
right thing a decade ago and sent a different signal to the LAPD. 
Id. (citations omitted.) The Lyons decision does not appear, however, to present a strong case 
in favor of the argument Professor Amar proposes. The fact is that the plaintiff in Lyons was 
denied injunctive relief for a very sound reason: his case was moot. He was unable to allege 
plausibly that he himself would again be the victim of unconstitutional conduct. This “irrepa-
rable injury” element is essential to the injunction claim, as it allocates social resources opti-
mally. See Standen, supra note 34, at 153–64. Moreover, even had the defect in pleadings been 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The point of this selection is to demonstrate that the exclusion-
ary remedy does not promise to fulfill the tasks established for it. Ex-
clusion does not provide a plausible vehicle to generate deterrence 
against unconstitutional police action, at least not when compared to 
damages. Damages are based on harm; exclusion on gain. If the total 
quantum of harm caused by unconstitutional police action exceeds 
the total quantum of gain, then by inference a penalty that is set ac-
cording to harm would be larger than one set according to gain. Ex-
clusion does not necessarily portend to elicit higher enforcement 
rates sufficient to supplant this inadequacy. Exclusion also exacer-
bates the problem of the prisoner’s dilemma in police-citizen interac-
tions and does little to overcome agency problems. 
Nor do practical concerns militate in favor of exclusion; a dam-
ages remedy can be fashioned to mirror all of the essential attributes 
of exclusion, if those attributes are thought desirable. Thus, damages 
can be paid by the government, not the officer, mimicking the way 
exclusion creates a social penalty. In addition, damages do not ap-
pear to present significantly different difficulties of valuation as com-
pared to exclusion: both involve difficult issues of causation and 
valuation. Finally, despite many contentions to the contrary, it seems 
patent that the exclusionary rule produces different outcomes at 
some trials than would a damages remedy. Exclusion attempts to 
prohibit conduct; damages price it, and so by implication the police 
could theoretically be willing to violate the Constitution and pay 
damages for the chance to use important evidence at trial. Such oc-
currences would likely be few, given the unpredictability of the re-
sults of police activity and the shifting value of evidence at trial. Even 
so, the prosecution should, where the occasion presents itself, be al-
lowed to use unconstitutionally obtained evidence. As long as the 
criminal defendant has access to a suitable damages remedy, the de-
fendant is being treated as well as any other victim of unconstitu-
tionality; no reason, at least none grounded in the need for  
 
 
corrected, perhaps through a class action, it is doubtful that an injunction would have had the 
beneficent consequences Amar envisions. Injunctions require highly difficult guesses about 
future conduct and causation and often fail to achieve their purposes, even purposes much 
more attainable than righting race relations in Los Angeles. See Standen, supra note 34, at 
153–64. 
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deterrence, suggests that the victim should gain a premium because 
he has been charged with a crime. 
